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ABSTRACT
ALLEY ESTELLE RONALDI: Healthcare Reform in Context of the Unique Case of
Mississippi's Diabetic Population
Healthcare reform in the United States is a highly complex issue that is influenced by a number of
economic, social, and political factors. These factors have converged in Mississippi to exacerbate
reliance on acute care and the high costs associated with tertiary-level diabetes treatment. It has
been thoroughly researched that continuous primary care is most the cost effective and
convenient treatment for diabetes, yet such treatment centers are scarce in Mississippi due to
healthcare payment structures. It is for these reasons that Mississippi is used as an excellent test
case for reform proposals. Two of the most polar and popular reform proposals involve the
implementations of market-driven system or the single-payer entity as propagated by Regina
Herzlinger and Dr. Arnold Reiman, respectively. In order to simplify these reforms in the
contexts of the unique demands of the diabetic population of Mississippi, this thesis offers
outlines of both proposals, as well as the expected effects of the two separate proposals on
altering public health status and expenditure patterns. It was found through extensive literature
review that the most beneficial reform for the diabetic population of Mississippi is the single
payer entity proposal offered by Dr. Reiman. The nature of the single-payer system aligns the
incentives of payers, providers, and consumers of care in a top-down manner that most suites the
needs of the individual by providing universal access to the primary care that is most needed by
the chronically ill patients. This primary care would correspondingly reduce aggregate spending
on

expensive acute treatment for diabetes, thus substantially reducing overall cost to the state of

Mississippi. However, there are some serious implications associated for such drastic changes in
healthcare provision in the US,and these will also be addressed. Amendments will then be
proposed to moderate the sizeable gaps associated with loss of innovation from implementation
of a single-payer entity by allowing market-driven incentive structures for chronic disease care.
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“In 2008,about 750,000 bankruptcies were filed. About 70 percent of
those bankruptcies were filed because of health care costs. Eighty
percent of the people who filed for bankruptcy because of health care
costs had health insurance. America is the only country in the world
where if you get sick or hurt, you’re going to have file for bankruptcy.'
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid

I,INTRODUCTION
Healthcare reform is necessary, imminent and will affect the entire population of
the United States in a direct manner. Reform proposals have been consistently circulated
for a generation, and as this generation continues to age, a change must be made to avoid
total collapse of the healthcare sector. The individuals who are most affected by the
disparity and inefficiency in the healthcare service sector are the uninsured, underinsured,
and rural populations. Of these individuals, the most consistently demanding of the
healthcare sector are those with chronic diseases. Mississippi leads the nation in the
proportion of the state's population with diabetes. This, coupled with the high percent of
these individuals that are also underinsured,,poses a very unique problem to Mississippi,
and one that must be addressed directly by healthcare reform. Diabetes is a treatable
disease, yet complications add burdens to individuals economically and physically
because of their inability to obtain proper primary care. In Mississippi, the problem is
exacerbated by the high percentage of citizens living in rural areas.
Diabetes, as a disease, is representative of the effects of our inefficient healthcare
system; it is preventable in most cases, ifs expense and effects are reduced by consistent
primary care, and it affects the poor and rural populations at a disproportionately high
rate. The fact that over 11 % of the population of Mississippi has type 2 diabetes(MS fact
sheet) indicates that our healthcare system is very sick. What's worse is that the large
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number of insured and uninsured individuals in Mississippi are paying out of pocket for
their primary care, or not getting primary care at all. The fact that these individuals are
unable to access basic treatments to control their diabetes indicates the imminence of
major future stresses on the tertiary care providers for the expensive but life-saving care
of diabetic complications. These are expenses that Mississippi, and the US as a whole.
will not be able to afford.
I intend to analyze two leading healthcare reform proposals in the context of
diabetes treatment in Mississippi in order to gain insight as to which system would
address the issue most efficiently and universally in a sustainable manner by:
1. Demonstrating the importance of continuous primary care in diabetes
treatment and providing a brief explanation of the complexities of
treatment
2. Analyzing and contextualizing the two major reform philosophies, the
market-driven system and the single-payer system, in terms of
Mississippi
3. Predict which reform idea would be most effective in addressing the
diabetes epidemic in Mississippi.

“If all we’re doing is adding more people to a broken system then
costs will continue to skyrocket, and eventually somebody is going to
be bankrupt, whether it’s the federal government,state governments,
businesses or individual families.” President Obama

SYSTEMIC PATHOLOGIES OF AMERICAN HEALTHCARE
The US healthcare sector currently operates under a shielded market economy.
Consumer are shielded from their purchases by third-paity payers, the payers are shielded
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by policy protections which have resulted in monopolistic business practices, and
providers are encouraged to create 'economies-of-scale' which eliminate diversity. These
pathologies have resulted in one of the most inefficient healthcare systems in the world
(Garber). To be exact, the United States spent 16.5 % of its GDP on health care in 2005
(Reid 13). This is indicative of leaks in the system. The money is being used
inefficiently and resulting a large concentration of wealth in the industry, as over 45
million individuals are stuck in the complete poverty of being without insurance.
It is for these reasons that healthcare reform is a salient and necessary political,
social, and economic battle. By using the insight gleaned from authors Dr. Arnold
Reiman and Regina Herzlinger, the reasons that no effective restructuring of healthcare
structure has been implemented, and what needs to be done to address such issues. Both
authors make the argument that current policies regarding tax breaks give large health
corporations (such as pharmaceuticals and conglomerated hospitals) a great advantage to
operate with a monopolized presence in the industry. This would then reduce
competition of the supply side and suppress innovation within the administrative and
financial branch of healthcare. With the amount of money funneled into the healthcare
industry, and the advances that have been made in healthcare in recent years, individuals
should be healthier than they are in other countries. This, however, is most certainly not
the case. Most of the money that insurance companies dole out is typically not allotted to
primary and preventative care in a way that encourages that people go to doctors to stay
healthy rather than waiting until they get sick. However, where the authors’ opinions
differ is their treatment of these situations.
Understanding of potential reform systems is especially important and timely
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because of the financial stresses that consumers and providers of healthcare are under in
the present economic environment. Reform is necessary, but it needs to be more than
mandating insurance. It needs to include a restructuring of the system to allow for a
supply that provides for a demand, rather than a supply that imposes itself upon the
demand. As Medicaid and Medicare reforms threaten to slash physicians salary by 26%
by 2012, while also increasing their costs of operation by 15 % or more(AMA),the loss
of not only competent private, primary care clinics in the private insurance sector will be
irreversibly damaging to the general wellbeing of the public. This would further the
current trend towards tertiary care, and the problems associated with reliance upon it.
However, what's more important is that the direct affect on future generations in the US
would be devastating.
If such a trend towards tertiary care in the private sector continues, the draw for
primary physicians will evaporate. One of the reasons healthcare in the US is so
advanced is because of the selectivity and intensive training of healthcare professionals.
To be a physician, a minimum of4 years of schooling beyond a bachelor s degree is
required. The cost that the individuals must pay as a result of these years range from
$100,000 to $400,000. Beyond that financial and time commitment there are required
residencies. This is where the divergence between primary and tertiary care appears.
This choice will provide a range of three to seven additional years of residency training
with surgery maintaining at least a five-year requirement. Above and beyond this, some
choose to continue through a fellowship so that they may sub specialize. Including the
undergraduate degree, this is 17 years of school. The point of this information is to
demonstrate that the individuals who choose to enter into such an industry do so because
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they like to leam and advance their understanding while also doing everything they can to
heal others, not just because of the salary that comes with it. If the supply side of the
chain continues to dictate treatments that healthcare providers are able to give, the United
States will experience a loss of the elite physicians that have served to innovate and
advance medicine in recent generations.

A POTENTIAL CURE FOR MISSISSIPPI
In recent years, Mississippi has been the target of development programs due to
the extreme underdevelopment and poverty of the state. Twenty-nine percent of the
population is at or below the federal poverty level in Mississippi, in comparison to the
21 % of the total population of the US (Kaiser). This coupled with the 5% higher
obesity/ overweight rate among adults, and 12.8 % higher rate among children (Kaiser),
paints a dire picture for the future of diabetes treatment in Mississippi. The growing
expense of healthcare is placing further pressure on businesses, which are having trouble
remaining competitive with the high costs of labor. These conflicts have compounded to
expand socioeconomic gap in Mississippi, and is now causing stagnation in the
development of rural areas in Mississippi. In studies of the underserved communities of
Mississippi, there are significant disparities in health status indicators, which are directly
correlated with income. The indicators used in the study by Felix and Stewart, included
infant mortality rate, age adjusted heart disease mortality rate, age-adjusted cancer
mortality rate, age adjusted heart disease mortality rate, life expectancy for females, and
life expectancy for males. The results of the study were consistent with the theory that
health is directly related to socioeconomic status of the geographic region. Thus, the
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healthcare expense issue will only serve to worsen Mississippi's already poor economic
conditions and outlook.
For example, in communities such as Baptist Town in Greenwood, Mississippi,
there are challenges of obtaining health care because of crushing poverty, geographic
isolation, and lack of health education. In a recent Delta Rural Poll,44% of those
surveyed in the Delta have to travel 30 miles each way to receive specialized health care
(Abrokwa). These are frightening statistics because in order for Mississippi is to
continue to develop as a state, all socioeconomic sectors must develop so that the gap
does not become more blatant and corrosive.
The problems have been successfully addressed by the continuous,
comprehensive care provided by community healthcare centers(CHCs) which are
government-funded practices that synthesize the efforts of multiple levels of healthcare
professionals to provide a patient-centered experience in one geographic location. This is
the kind of reform that could help Mississippi out of its cyclically reinforcing povertyhealth relationship, and is therefore, what needs to be provided by reforms. The next
question is how to incentivize the community health practice so that they may be applied
in a universal manner to the entire healthcare service sector?
CHCs are primary and preventative care systems whose target is to treat the
uninsured and those insured by Medicare and Medicaid. CHCs have been proven to be
highly successful in their endeavors, and have been saving the healthcare industry of the
United States an estimated 24 billion dollars annually, which translates to savings of
$1,263 per person. This amount is expected to reach 55 billion dollars by 2015
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(NACHC). It is innovations that are forced by scarcity and demand that have resulted in
the effeciency of such clinics.
In Mississippi there are 21 CHC organizations with 170 total delivery sites that
serve 310,759 total patients, which amounts to 24% of the total population of Mississippi
that is at or below the poverty line(NACHC). The simple fact that these centers have
proven to be a huge money-saving boon for the healthcare industry is indicative of a
revolutionary and innovative patient-centered care system that needs to be applied
outside universally in the healthcare sector. CHCs treat a larger proportion of chronic and
treatment-intensive diseases than do other providers(NACHC). This indicates incredible
success because chronic diseases are of the most difficult and time and capital-intensive
diseases to treat. In order for the treatment of such diseases to be effective, major
lifestyle changes must occur, and patients must be diligent with daily medical treatments.
"The source of health centers’ success lies in their local ownership and direction
under a patient majority board that is accountable and responsive to community health
needs. Research shows that consumer participation on governing boards ensures higher
quality care, lower costs of services, and better results. Their community-directed non
profit model of care, along with other unique characteristics, make health centers more
than just places to access care, but rather true industry leaders in improving health and
producing cost savings"(NACHC). The qualifications for being considered a CHC are
as follows: located in high-need areas that have demonstrated high poverty, low access to
healthcare, and poor health indicators (such as infant mortality rates), they must provide
care to all residents regardless of insurance status, must provide a comprehensive set of
services of the primary and preventative nature, and they must perform community-needs
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assessments. This kind of innovation is non-existent in the rest of the healthcare sector.
and this problem is addressed in various ways by both reform proposals.
According to most literature, the reason for their success is largely due to their
ability to perform necessary actions based on needs of individuals rather than performing
based on insurance incentives. The patients at these clinics are uninsured, so insurance is
a non-issue. Jackson Free Clinic for the Homeless in Jackson has been an excellent
example of this efficiency in its operations, and is run entirely on a volunteer basis.
Medical school students are encouraged to involve themselves as a way to not only gain
hands-on experience in practicing medicine, but also provide a more human aspect to the
science of medicine. The fact that this has been one of the most successful free clinics in
the mid south, and is run mostly by medical, pharmacy and nursing students and other
community volunteers, speaks to the success of allowing professionals who have a
compassionate streak use their skills for others by applying their healthcare knowledge to
improve patients' outlook. This demonstrates the importance of having economic
incentives of care providers aligned with the patient in order to achieve maximal results,
or else the economic incentives regarding care must be eliminated altogether.
Interestingly, it appears that it also may be less expensive in the long run to offer
the most appropriate treatment, rather than the least expensive. This has been well
documented by the World Health Organization who chose to make the topic of their 2008
Summit about the importance of primary and preventative care. The nature of health
makes it an ongoing process, not a destination. Yet, this is how it is treated by paymentfor-treatment reimbursement system, which is what US healthcare offers. It is all about
the sale of a given product, and the profit-driven actions that attend to that. Individuals,
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however, are not just consumers but people. They are far more complex and
differentiated than the mandated treatments that insurance offers. There is little room for
maneuverability in treatment with the majority of third-payers, leaving little room for the
complexities and changes in a human's life. American doctors go to school for a decade
so that they might effectively treat people on a case-by-case basis, rather than a one-sizefits-all basis.
By utilizing a medical professional’s understanding of the process of healthcare
and treatment, fused with coordination with non-profit organizations such as the Delta
Health Alliance, successful facets of rural healthcare programs can be identified,
mimicked, and supported by state and federal funding policies in a sustainable manner.
Community based efforts have been proven to be much more effective than reliance upon
a centralized urban hospital system, so it would be logical to assume that funding would
be allocated in this direction accordingly. This is not the case, however. The private US
healthcare sector is counterbalanced towards tertiary care because of the disincentives
many insurance providers offer to those consumers seeking to remain healthy, rather than
to only use the resources available when they become sick. Treating the sick is much
more expensive that maintaining the healthy. As the saying goes; an ounce of prevention
is worth a pound of treatment.
The CHCs that would save money and promote general wellness cannot exist
within the current private sector due the fragmented payment process of US healthcare.
In order for healthcare to become efficient, practices like CHCs must be able to enter the
market and compete with non-profit and for-profit hospitals. This is a problem that Dr.
Arnold Reiman and Regina Herzlinger address in very different ways. Which would
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realistically allow the incentives of such innovations in care to operate sustainably in
Missississippi?

REFORM PROPOSALS
Dr. Arnold Reiman, MD,promotes the elimination of the influence of economic
pressures by conglomerating all payers (insurers), both public and private, into a
government-moderated entity. This single-payer would eliminate diversity and promote
the efficiency through uniformity that inherent when there is only one consumer. This
system would be set up to negotiate and set rates with all providers of care based on the
number of patients that individual clinics serve. He is a proponent of aggregation of care
into community clinics that are responsible for a given number of patients per physician.
Physicians would be paid a salary by the single-payer, which is relatively universal, with
the exception of bonuses offered and some disparities between generalists and specialists.
Dr. Reiman is essentially advocating a restructuring of healthcare from the top to the
bottom.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Regina Herzlinger, trumpets market forces as
the savior to our current predicament. By returning the responsibility of health to the
individual and increasing the transparency and diversity of medical services, an
individualized demand will drive the diversification that is characteristic of true liberal
economies. She would open up the healthcare market to capitalistic forces by reducing
government’s hand in tax breaks and subsidies associated with employer-purchased
insurance. By appropriating that responsibility to the individual, insurance companies are
forced to diversify services offered and increase transparency. This would force the
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inefficient firms out of the market. Providers of care would also have to restructure their
practices to make efficient use of capital, while also providing care that is responsive to
the individual consumer. Finally, by putting the costs of care into the hands of the
individual, they are empowered to change their healthcare circumstances as they see fit,
as economically rational consumers of care. This would mean understanding the cost of
care in a more direct manner. The incentives to innovate all facets of healthcare would
be allowed to fully influence health economics, so that appropriate care is provided in a
more efficient manner. Herzlinger believes that ‘focused factories’ would result. These
would be directed at care for one disease, or one specific operation. By focusing all
factors of care to one service, that service is simplified and perfected. Essentially, what
would result is a responsive care facility directed towards the needs of the individuals of
that geographic market. This is her solution to the demands of specific disease care
through continuous and specific treatment, as demanded by the local market. Therefore it
is her solution to the current demand of efficient treatment for chronic care patients, like
those with diabetes.

METHODS
The US healthcare industry is sick because of the loss of innovation incentives for
providing efficient and effective care. CHCs were developed in a budget-constrained
public setting that forced the creation of new management systems for the treatment of
patients with chronic diseases. The entire healthcare service industry needs to take from
the lessons learned in the efficient structuring of CHCs,and this paper will serve to make
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those connections and offer ways in which the proposed reforms would individually
address the growing need for primary care in an economically constrained setting.
By the conclusion of this paper the major reform proposals will be examined and
applied to the current economic and health status of Mississippi. It has been well
documented that the most successful and inexpensive way to treat diabetes is through
continuous and attentive care. The CHC model provides valuable insights for the
importance of restructuring the system in a way that allows for these kinds of clinics to be
made possible. The reform proposals of Regina Herzlinger and Dr. Arnold Reiman both
propose reformed systems that, if successful, would open up the market to more efficient
and available care. By doing so, the costs of healthcare would be reduced from the
supply side. The question is therefore how to make the healthcare marketplace hospital
to CHC-like systems that are desperately needed to address the diabetes epidemic in
Mississippi. I will address this issue by first briefly explaining the complexities of
diabetes in order to provide support for the importance of consistent primary care, as well
as the flaws in delivery of this care under the current system. Then I will devote the
following two chapters to reviews of the two reform proposals. In the final chapter I will
provide justification for my prediction of the most promising reform for diabetic
treatment in Mississippi.
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"There is a generation of doctors today that are stuck in the
crossroads of what medicine used to be, and what it has become. This
generation graduated medical school before fee-for-service payments
and insurance entanglements in patient care were implemented. They
remember what it used to be like to leave a patient room thinking
about what is wrong with the patient and how best to treat them,
rather than the situation today,in which they leave the room
considering what class of visit they just made and the reimbursement
that goes with it. It is a difficult adjustment to make." -Dr. Jean
Gispen

TI. THE EPIDEMIC OF TYPE II DIABETES
In this chapter I will describe the causes and complexities associated with type 2
diabetes and the treatments and lifestyle necessary to manage the disease, as well as how
these demands are left unmet by current systematic pathologies in the US healthcare
system. This chapter is structured to give the reader a greater understanding of the
complexities of diabetes treatments, and the ways in which these complexities are
exacerbated by the complex and incoherent treatment system that operates today. This
will be accomplished by describing diabetes treatment from the perspective of a
practicing primary care physician. Dr. Gispen, but first diabetes will be described from
sociological and biological perspectives.

BIOLOGY
In order to understand the different sociological factors that have contributed to
the current state of health in Mississippi, I will give a brief overview of the disease.
Diabetes is one of the most complex, misunderstood, and mistreated diseases in history.
Beginning with the Hindu physician Sushruta, who wrote in the 6th century BC about
diagnosis of a disease of "honey urine." (Tattersal), which included taste testing the urine.
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Today, our understanding of a once mysterious and elusive disease has increased
tremendously, but the irony of the matter is that there is no cure. Researchers know
exactly what needs to be done in order to improve the lives of millions, but they are
unable to provide a conclusive answer to the cause of dangerous fluctuations of glucose
concentration in the blood that occurs with diabetics.
To be more specific, there are several types of diabetes that have been isolated by
the specific malfunctions of the insulin that the body produces, if any at all. Insulin is a
hormone that’s purpose is to signal high blood glucose levels. Cells then respond by
taking up glucose to be used for metabolic purposes. Type 1 diabetics, often called
'juvenile diabetics' are completely insulin dependent. Physicians t}^ically describe
individuals diagnosed with type 1 diabetes disease as young, slender, and sickly. Though
this version of diabetes is problematic and dangerous if it goes untreated, it is not
responsible for the epidemic that is spreading through Mississippi. Type 2 diabetes
makes this claim. Also called adult-onset diabetes, its cause is insulin resistance in the
body. Because diabetes is a problem of malfunctioning insulin, which is a hormone that
causes cells to take in glucose (the body’s energy currency) when functioning properly, a
lot of the energy derived from the diet is urinated out. This is because the kidneys deem
this an excess of blood sugar, which is strictly regulated by the renal system,

So these

calories are essentially lost to the filtration of the renal system. Once treatment of a
diabetic is started, and this situation is alleviated by treatments that are prescribed, the
patient consumes the same number of calories, but the calories are actually absorbed by
the body's cells. This can lead to further weight gain thus increasing the problems
associated with type 2 diabetes. The body’s inability to properly process glucose can
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manifest in multiple systemic failures that include, but are not limited to, circulatory.
renal, hepatic, and nervous systems. In order to avoid such complications blood glucose
must be strictly monitored at all times.

SOCIOLOGY
We now know more about the disease, and have more treatments for it than any
preceding generation, however this has proven ineffective in controlling the epidemic.
The conundrum of advanced healthcare is the duality of high expense and increased
reliance for treatment of chronic diseases. People have an expectation that they go to the
doctor when they are sick, and that will make them healthy. The issue is, that if this
demand applied by diabetics is to be universally met, which it rarely is, expensive,
complicated and repetitive treatments must be given. It has been proven to be much more
effective to alter lifestyle and increase patient education about the disease coupled with
basic treatment. As early as 1920 diabetic clinics in England were hiring nurses whose
purpose was to educate the patients solely about diabetes treatment and provide them
with the support they would need to treat the complex disease. However, this proved to
be ineffective because the nurses did not describe the disease itself to their patients in a
comprehensive manner. The patients were then unable to understand their symptoms
enough to take control of their blood glucose levels. These diabetic clinics continued with
this ineffective education system for 60 years. A survey of a similar clinic was taken in
1975. This clinic used the following means for providing patients dietary guidelines; 12
percent used posters for dietary education, 15 percent food models,8 percent used group
teach, while 59 percent advised the spouse (Tattersal 132). Obviously this system was
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entirely ineffective as well: "A 1967 American survey found that only one in eight
patients was even approximately following his or her prescribed diet." (Tattersal 132)
According to the Center for Disease Control the main treatment for diabetes is diet and
exercise. Yet if patients are unable to recognize symptoms of glucose imbalances and
understand how best to reverse them, they are unable to maintain a healthy program.
This lack of proper education is how a chronic, preventable, non-communicable disease
became an epidemic. Another outstanding example of the effects of the neglect of
appropriate care, and how such neglect can cause the aggregation of a mostly
preventative disease into a state epidemic will be provided the following sociological
study.
In an interesting case of lifestyle changes induced by various economic forces, it
was made quite obvious that diabetes could be directly correlated to 'westernization and
the diets and lifestyle associated with it. The Pima Indians of Arizona maintained an
agricultural economy and lifestyle by irrigating the desert until the early 20th century,
when European settlers diverted the water, causing farms to dry up. Thus they were no
longer able to maintain such an economy and were forced to live off welfare. The
associated reality was the change from their traditional diet, which consisted mainly of
vegetables and legumes that they produced to a highly processed and calorically dense
'western' diet. Essentially they went from a physical labor-reliant subsistence lifestyle,
which allowed for consumption of fresh foods to a relatively sedentary lifestyle that only
provided for a limited diet of inexpensive and processed foods. The devastating results
of such a process demonstrate the cyclically damaging nature of the disease. Since their
displacement, diabetes prevalence among the Pima Indians went from a low 3 percent of
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the population to an astounding 37 percent of men and 54 percent of women (Tattersal
190). The increasing number of type 2 diabetics among the Pima Indians is in parallel to
the technological advancements of the 20th century. This alone indicates that the ’cure'
cannot be found in medicine alone.
What makes this study even more relevant is that the situation of the Pima Indians
is similar to that of the population of Mississippi. As Mississippi continues its trend
away from a largely agricultural state to a more urbanized system, not only do many
physical laborers lose their jobs, but those that do relocate and find another job typically
find a less manual labor oriented position. This, coupled with the economic downturn in
recent years, has forced people to cut back on how much they spend on food, as well as
how much time they have available to prepare it. Thus the result is the overconsumption
of cheap, calorically dense, processed foods. As most citizens of the state of Mississippi
are aware, Mississippi is the most obese country in the nation. This is due to a number of
sociological factors, as well as medical factors, seeing as Mississippi ranks 49th in
physicians per capita(MSMA). The truly confounding issue in all of these statistics is
that it is also one of the poorest. People simply cannot afford the treatment need to help
stabilize their blood glucose. Mississippi's diabetes prevalence has risen from 9.5% in
2005 to 11.1% in 2007. This represents a 16.8% increase. In addition, 30,123 individuals
were diagnosed with pre-diabetes in 2006."(MS fact sheet) Simply put, what we have
been doing to prevent and treat type 2 diabetes is not working, yet, ironically, we now
know how it can be treated using both advanced medicines and preventative medicines.
Therefore the issues must lie with the delivery, availability, and substance of care. The
care provided to diabetes patients must be holistic and not solely focused on their
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biochemistry. It must involve education as well as the appropriate support for the
lifestyle changes necessary to limit the disease. This is a critical pillar to the successes of
CHCs in providing primary care to diabetics.
The geography of Mississippi also compounds the problems of accessing basic
care and education to control diabetes. 56 percent of the population of Mississippi lives
in rural areas(MSDH). It is these individuals who struggle most in accessing healthcare,
and for whom CHCs were designed. As described in the introductory chapter, there are
counties in which people live that are as much as a 40-minute drive away from the
nearest specialist(Abrokwa). The current healthcare system has not allowed for much
incentive for getting primary care providers to take on the overhead costs of operating a
rural clinic for a sparsely populated area for Mississippians. Because Mississippi ranks
48th in median per family income(MSDH),chances are that these rural residents will
also be underinsured, another factor going against for rural primary care

access.

PROBLEMS ON THE AGGREGATE
The major transitions in the practice of treating patients occurred in 1992 when Medicare
introduced the Medicare Fee Schedule, which was essentially a list of services and their
reimbursements based on a formula that takes into account most expenses associated with
the treatment. The scale used is called the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale. A
board of 29, mostly specialist, physicians for the American Medical Association,
proposed this list of 7,000 services. This list has been amended in the many years since,
but still serves as the basis for medical treatment reimbursement. The majority of private
insurance use this payment model as a payment method as well. The idea behind this
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was that there would be less of a loss for the providers of care if the services provided
were explicitly reimbursed and formulaic. The issue, however, is in the economic
incentives involved with this list. There is little reimbursement for primary services, such
as patient education, time spent with patients in both diagnosis and discussion of
treatment, and for minor procedures or treatments. Rather, there are considerable
financial surpluses for providers (both doctors and hospitals) for the most advanced,
invasive, and acute care. Thus the existing incentives push physicians and medical
students not only in the direction of becoming specialty providers, but also towards
specialties that provide the most advanced and invasive treatments. This has allowed for
a significant advance in the ability of the US healthcare system to provide the best acute
care in the world, but quite possibly the least efficient primary chronic care.
Health care has become such a burden in the United States because of the existing
perverse incentives toward providing high levels of acute care for chronic diseases
associated with sociological lifestyle factors. The most effective treatment for diabetes is
patient-centric and team oriented. The nature of the disease is one that cannot be isolated
and treated biochemically alone. There must be a major shift in lifestyle if any medical
treatment is going to be effective. Not only that, but the patient has to fully understand
their condition, and the treatment that they are prescribed so that they can do what is
necessary to avoid diabetic complications. In order to gain perspectives of the problem
of applying the most effective treatment to diabetic at a clinical level, I interviewed Dr.
Gispen.
Dr. Jean Gispen was an excellent professional to conduct this interview with
because of her diverse knowledge when it comes to understanding the system. She has
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spent time as a chronic disease specialist(Rheumatology) and is now a primary care
provider to the employees of the University of Mississippi. She graduated medical
school from Duke University and had been practicing medicine for the 21 years since
when she joined the Employee Health Service in 2005. During those years the practiced
as both an internist and rheumatologist at a private practice called Greenhill s Medical
Clinic in Nashville, Tennessee. By the nature of her transition into the primary care field
at the Health Services Center, she was able to provide a knowledgeable synopsis in the
provisions of both specialist and primary care providers. She also has been practicing
medicine for enough time to have had to adjust to critical transitions in both the
treatments and payment systems for chronic diseases, like diabetes.
Dr. Gispen began practicing medicine at a time when insurance was not the
central factor in providing medical care and treatments were left up to physicians
competent knowledge of what would be most effective for the specific patient. Not only
that, but because of advances in biomedical research there are a lot more prescription
drugs on the market for physicians to choose from. However, with these advances,
reliance on prescriptions has become much more significant and according to Dr. Gispen
it is sometimes more difficult to refer a patient to a dietician, especially in a small town in
Mississippi, like Oxford, than it is to prescribe a treatment regimen. If this is the case for
a small, but thriving town such as Oxford, the problem is even greater in rural
underserved areas of Mississippi. This is indicative of the loss of the care for the whole
individual. Because the physicians are not compensated wholly for the time that they
spend with patients, they do what they are forced to do, which is to prescribe biomedical
treatment. In fact, according to a New York Times article, insurers will balk at the $75
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cost of sending a patient to a nutritionist, but will readily pay for the $315 dialysis session
charge (Reid 159). This preventative care neglect demonstrates reasons for consumers’
growing reliance upon acute treatment.
Drugs associated with diabetes treatment are not universally beneficial to all
diabetics, and the most successful treatments can vary greatly between individuals. The
drugs that have been in use and available to diabetic patients are targeted at alleviating
the symptoms, as there is no cure for the disease itself. Insulin is most often used when
treating type 1 diabetes, and far more rarely when treating type 2 diabetes. In fact, the
only time insulin is used in the management of type 2 is when the blood sugar levels have
temporarily slipped out of control, and need to be readjusted drastically. This typically
happens after some other form of illness, or a complication of the disease itself, which
leaves the body systems even further out of order. Insulin is avoided in management of
type 2 diabetes, because it can result in weight gain. Treatment of the complications of
diabetes, rather than the primary disease, costs drastically more to the individual, and the
healthcare system as a whole, but are often underused in lieu of the expensive, acutetreatment that becomes necessary upon serious complications associated with diabetes.
As has been demonstrated, diabetes is incredibly complex to treat, even for medical
professionals who understand the workings of the body. Once the lifestyle changes that
must accompany the medicines, in order for them to be fully effective, are added into the
equation, treatment of type 2 diabetes becomes an incredibly daunting task for an
individual. This is especially relevant if the patient is expected to manage their care
without continuous support of medical professionals. The outcomes for the individual
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become increasingly bleak when all factors contributing to their situation, and attentions
required in order to alleviate diabetic symptoms, are considered.

CURRENT TREATMENTS
During our interview. Dr. Gispen described several type 2 diabetes treatments that were
all developed to help the body's response to insulin to help reduce major swings in sugar
levels. She also described some of the newer treatments, which were designed to make
people feel fuller faster while eating and also cut down on the blood sugar spike that
occurs directly after eating a meal. One of the most threatening of these side effects is an
issue called metabolic ketoacidosis. This is a condition where the blood sugar becomes
so high that the individual will need immediate emergency treatment to avoid further
complications. However, the benefits of certain generic drugs for blood-glucose
controlling drugs include weight loss, stable blood sugar, and an overall increase in the
body's response to insulin.
As occurs frequently with medicine, economic pressures limit the prescriptions
that physicians are able to make based upon availability of generic forms of certain drugs.
However, these options can be limited by federal policies that protect the sale of certain
'infant drugs.' These are drugs that have been patented for 12 years once released to the
US market. For instance. Metformin, a generic glucophage used for controlling blood
sugar swings, was developed as early as 1957, but remarkably did not reach the US
market until 1994. It was first marketed in France as early as 1979, but the US Food and
Drug Administration did not allow it to circulate in US markets for fear of problems with
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acidosis. It is very interesting that a drug that was widely used in France 15 years before
wasn't allowed in the US until the mid 90's, nearly 40 years after its development.
Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist and Chief Economist for the
World Bank described the ethical and economic issue with the intellectual patent on
drugs:
"Intellectual property differs from other property—restricting its use is
inefficient as it costs nothing for another person to use it— Using knowledge to
help someone does not prevent that knowledge from helping others. Intellectual
property rights, however, enable one person or company to have exclusive
control of the use of a particular piece of knowledge, thereby creating monopoly
power. Monopolies distort the economy. Restricting the use of medical
knowledge not only affects economic efficiency, but also life itself. We tolerate
such restrictions in the belief that they might spur innovation, balancing costs
against benefits. But the costs of restrictions can outweigh the benefits. It is hard
to see how the patent issued by the US government for the healing properties of
turmeric, which had been known for hundreds of years, stimulated research.
Had the patent been enforced in India, poor people who wanted to use this
compound would have had to pay royalties to the United States— The
establishment of the World Trade Organization ... imposed US style intellectual
property rights around the world. These rights were intended to reduce access to
generic medicines and they succeeded. As generic medicines cost a fraction of
their brand name counterparts, billions could no longer afford the drugs they
needed
Developing countries paid a high price for this agreement. But what have they
received in return? Drug companies spend more on advertising and rnarketing
than on research, more on research on lifestyle drugs than on life saving drugs,
and almost nothing on diseases that affect developing countries only. This is not
surprising. Poor people cannot afford drugs, and drug companies make
investments that yield the highest returns." (Stiglitz)
In the United States, economically driven monopolistic practices are being protected in
the healthcare sector. On the aggregate such practices have artificially increased
healthcare costs by not allowing competition to limit prices paid for protected treatments.
This is essentially the illness of medical treatment today. Malpractice insurance for
physicians, as well as the overhead costs for running a private practice, makes it
impossible to start a practice based upon spending the optimal time with chronic disease
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patients in order to truly help them improve their outlook. When major pharmaceuticals
monopolistic practices are protected, they will become the most extensively used sect of
healthcare. The results of such practices have tainted patient care at a clinical level
because there are no economic protections where they are most necessary; at the
individual level.

PROBLEMS AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
A primary care physician is advantaged to treat patients using prescriptions rather than
spending time discussing their disease with them. Dr. Gispen pointed out that the hour
spent with the patient upon diagnosis, as well as the full physical are not fully
compensated by insurance companies. The opportunity cost that physician incurs by
spending an hour with the patient, and reading through their glucose records, discourages
their doing so. If they are to be 'economically rational' they run the HbAc1 test, make the
diagnoses, prescribe the medicine and tell the patient to come back in a few months to
check up on them and refill their prescription. It is left up to the good will of the
physician to do such things as spending time sitting down with patients, going through
medical histories in detail, as well as examining patients’ weekly blood sugar readings.
The truly distressing matter in all of this is that an estimated 15 to 20 percent of the
patients that Dr. Gispen will see have diabetes, and very few will fully heed her warnings
and make the recommended changes that are required for control of the disease. This is
often blamed on lack of understanding or disempowerment on the patient's part. Yet, the
system reinforces this cycle by economically disincentivizing physicians to treat their
patients in the way that they know would truly help them. They are reliant upon
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biomedical treatment to maintain their practice in the face of massive malpractice
insurance fees, as well as the general overhead costs associated with operating a primary
care clinic.
Upon diagnosing a chronic disease, the effects of the prescribed treatment
regimen should be as closely monitored as possible. However, Dr. Gispen would only be
able to block out an hour to complete a full physical and attempt to spend an adequate
amount of time talking over the disease and treatment options. Then the patient will still
have to leave the clinic with a lot less information than what is necessary. It is unrealistic
and inefficient to have a physician spend any more time talking with a patient than this
because of the economics of insurance reimbursements. This is why she would then sign
the patient up for a diabetic seminar at the local hospital that includes a morning of 3 to 4
diabetes classes, with the hopes that the patient would be compliant and attend and learn
from the seminar. She also mentioned that at hospitals, the internists have a diabetic
educator on staff. This would be someone whose job was specifically to educate
diabetics of their disease. This would allow physicians to spend less time educating
patients, yet the patients would still obtain the necessary information. Dr. Gispen also
made a point to say that such an educator should be seen every couple of weeks to
improve patient understanding when first starting treatment. Glucometers make general
management of diabetes by the patient a possibility with at home blood testing. However,
because the patient probably won't understand what they are reading yet, she suggests
keeping a printed out record of the glucometer's reading and faxing the glucose record
once a week to her office. This is in addition to a monthly check-up for the first few
months. However, she knows that this is not enough to insure that the patient sufficiently
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monitors and controls blood sugar levels enough to avoid complications. That is why
lifestyle changes, such as lowered caloric intake and increased physical activity are also
recommended. The necessity associated with proper maintenance of diabetic treatment
cannot be understated.
Understanding the all-consuming nature of effective diabetes treatment helps to
understand the successes of CHC practices in treating the chronically ill. Dr. Gispen
made it clear that for chronic diseases, the optimal treatment team would include a highly
trained and specific physician who knows the ins and outs of the disease and is fully
updated on all current research and treatment regimens for the disease. Yet, it is these
specialists whose time is the most expensive. When asked about her opinion of the
Community Healthcare settings and services that are being provided in underserved areas
she thought it was highly effective way of allocating scarcities. Then, when asked why
the rest of the primary care sector has not undergone the same kind of transformation, she
cited the incredible start-up cost of a primary clinic, as well as other costs of practicing
medicine, such as malpractice insurance and medical school debt. This combination of
factors force doctors to rely heavily on the fee-for-service insurance system for
compensation rather than doing what may be in the best interest of the patient.
For instance, insurance companies and Medicare/Medicaid prescribe a regimen
for treatment of disease as discussed earlier, which mandates an attempt at generic, less
expensive prescriptions, before allowing the physician to prescribe a more effective
treatment. This leaves the physician to have to set up several appointments, do the
paperwork for several different prescriptions (opportunity cost lost), record the details of
the visit, then finally, once it has been fully established that the generic prescriptions that
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the doctors were forced to prescribe are ineffective, or have unwanted side effects, they
are allowed to prescribe the treatment that they knew all along would work. The losses in
this process are staggering, and that is just the convoluted path to treating one diabetic
with one drug regimen. The only thing in this process that the physician will be
adequately compensated for is the prescription writing. What adds to the pressure of a
primary care physician is that their time is not compensated for nearly as much as
specialist’s time, who provided the same treatment.

SUMMARY
By understanding the nature of type 2 diabetes, we are able to understand the problems
associated with current healthcare structures for treating chronic diseases. Due to the
high rates of type 2 diabetes in Mississippi, as well as the number of these Mississippians
that go without proper care due to lack of proper insurance or access to care.Judgments
can be passed about the strengths and weaknesses of our system. Obviously, these
Judgments have not been positive in regards to chronic care. There is no question that the
combined incentives for certain 'services provided' and the disincentives for a more
uniform and continuous care approach for health delivery have created a system of
reliance on drugs and invasive treatments, rather than preventative care. The reasons for
these negative influences will be made clear in the following two chapters from two very
different perspectives. Then, according to these diagnoses, two opposing reform
proposals will be outlined and applied to the diabetic population of Mississippi.
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III. The Single-Paver Argument
According to Dr. Reiman’s book, A Second Opinion, the rise in healthcare costs
are based on the changes in the costs of treatment, which is determined by the providers
of the care. Reiman cites the responsibility of the physicians and hospitals to provide the
treatment with the intention of curing the patient, rather than the treatment that is most
heavily reimbursed. They are able to obtain reimbursement for their services through the
cost-plus system, which means that the itemized bills that were submitted to insurance
companies were reimbursed, with the added fee that the provider demanded. The ethical
dilemmas that manifest from such economically-motivated practices are obvious. The
fact that the system places the responsibility of handling someone's life in the hands of
industrialists, which have their own interests at play, creates a huge strain between the
actors in medical provision and the ethics associated with healthcare. Rather than
cooperating to cure their patients, physicians and insurance companies are often at odds
in their view of appropriate treatment of the patients. If it is known that one treatment is
proven more effective than another, especially in the case of a complex disease such as
diabetes, it would be expected that this is the treatment that the patient would receive.
However, this is often not the case, especially if the necessary treatment is more
expensive than an alternative. Reiman argues that it is precisely this inherent economic
influence that causes the 'industry of healthcare' to be highly inefficient and unethical.

FAULTS OF THE SYSTEM
In order to provide a comprehensive overview of the effect of Reiman’s single-payer
solution, the problems with the current system will be described in accordance with
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Reiman’s theory. Then, his reform proposal will be summarized in a way that describes
the changes in care structures for the diabetic population. Finally, the direct effect on
diabetic care in Mississippi will be explained.
Reiman cites the work of economist Kenneth J. Arrow to differentiate the practice
of medicine from the other service industries. They are set apart from other markets by
the following characteristics:
"1) a demand for services that was irregular and unpredictable, and often
associated with what he called an "assault on personal integrity," because
it frequently arose from life-threatening illness or injury
2) a supply of services that did not simply respond to the desires of buyers
but was mainly determined by the professional judgement of physicians
about the medical needs of their patients(Arrow pointed out that doctors
differ from vendors of most other services because they are expected by ^
the norms of their profession to place a primary concern for their patients
medical needs above considerations of profit)
3)limitations on the entry of providers into the market, resulting from the
high costs and exacting standards of medical education and profession
licensure
4)insensitivity to price and a near absence of price competitions (Reiman
22).

Using these four premises he makes the argument that healthcare cannot be treated
capitalistically because it is not equivalent to the other services which the United States
market is known for providing. Kenneth Arrow made the above arguments in 1963,
before the term medical-industrial complex was even coined. As healthcare grew into a
larger and more advanced industry, the inequity of provision grew as well. This matter
was addressed by the social agenda pushed through by Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965. The
American Medical Association was in strong opposition of the governments absorbing
the industry, so the Social Security Act was temporarily staunched. It wasn’t until the bill
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was amended with the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid that the AMA allowed its
passage into law. This legislation made the US government the single largest insurer of
healthcare.
Third party payment structures for healthcare have resulted in the providers of
care being given the ability to essentially name their price free of market pressures,
because the constraints on their services would be too convoluted and complex to
implement on a large scale. According to Reiman, this provided a "powerful stimulus for
the growth of medical expenditures, particularly because most of the payment to
providers was on a fee-for-service basis, no questions asked"(Reiman 25). This also
incentivized the growth of a new branch of the medical field; specialties. The more a
specialist could provide some specific treatment or procedure, the more they were
reimbursed per time spent working. Obviously this does not bode well for the
economics of primary care provision due to it's time-intensive nature in comparison with
the treatment-intensive nature of specialist care. This system is great for innovation and
development of new treatments for acute conditions, but does not provide a stable
incentive structure for maintaining general health and well-being, which is what
healthcare providers are supposed to aspire to do.
Due to the lack of transparency in medical treatments, there is a largely priceinsensitive demand, meaning that hospitals and physicians are not competing on a costminimization basis. People will pay the cost difference to have the best kidney transplant
surgeon as opposed to the second best, even if the actual cost difference is huge. This is
because they are not directly paying the price, nor do they know or understand the cost of
services provided. Therefore the cost insensitivity coupled with capitalistic tendencies of
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provider have served to artificially promote the use of more expensive procedures and
services, because these are what pay providers the most in the current reimbursement.
The implications for diabetics under this market pressure is that they are not necessarily
receiving the kind of inexpensive, simple care that would keep them healthy, but the care
that tends to be most expensive, elaborate, and specialized. This wasting of resources has
lead to huge increases in insurance costs and premiums, thus leaving more part-time or
underinsured individuals out of the market. Because the proportion of diabetics that fall
into this category in Mississippi is so high, they will continue to get sick until they fall
into the catastrophically ill range, and are able to receive acute care for their emergencylevel diabetic complications. This is the care provided by emergency rooms that has cost
the healthcare economy billions (Kaiser).
Another major flaw in the logic of sole reliance upon market forces for
determining care provided is that capitalist markets inherently produce iniquity. As
healthcare providers continue to operate in a commercialized and profit-driven sector in
which demand is essentially unlimited, costs will continue to rise. As these costs rise,
insurance premiums must rise in accordance with them. This creates a barrier for
entering not only the health care market, but for entering any market in which an
employment incentive is provision of health insurance. The cost of employing workers
has exploded due to the cost of providing them with health insurance. This means that
employers limit the insurance for their employees, and government limits their Medicare
and Medicaid payments in the public sector. For individuals with diabetes, this can prove
to be even more problematic seeing as they have to constantly control their glucose,
which requires not only equipment, but drugs designed to stabilize their sugars. The
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resulting situation is one in which the patient can no longer afford their medical regimen,
so they ignore it, and the inevitable complications that arise from failure to control
diabetes completely incapacitates the individual, both physically and economically. This
not only puts pressure on the healthcare sector to provide the acute care necessary to save
the person’s life, but because of such complications a large percent of diabetic individuals
become physically unable to work at a young age, thus applying further pressure on both
social services, and the economy in general.
From a purely economic standpoint, the implications for a high barrier to entrance
into a market that has resulted from the increasing cost of care has significant
implications for the health of a perfectly competitive capitalist system. A liberal market
economy is based upon the flexibility of its markets and the limited barriers of entrance
into markets. Without the ability of firms to add themselves to the market, competition
will be increasingly limited. Once the competition that drives innovation ceases to exist,
the innovation will follow suite. This is bad for the economy of the US in general, but
especially poignant for the innovation within the healthcare sector. As it becomes
increasingly expensive to enter the healthcare market, advancement of the medical
technologies that the US is so proud of will cease. In essence, there will be a point at
which the faulty competition that exists currently in the healthcare marketplace will be
choked off and dissipated by the lack of true economic pressures relating to a limited
demand.
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PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE
Reiman’s solution to the enumerated problems is to essentially erase market pressure at
the provider level by subsuming payers into a conglomerated, government-sponsored
single-payer network. This solves the issue of administrative costs as well as the
disincentives toward appropriate care that are currently at work in the healthcare sector.
Reiman starts off this section of his argument by isolating the overhead costs of insurance
that have grown dramatically in the past couple of decades. In 2007, when the book was
published, the US was spending 2 trillion dollars a year on health care. This amounted to
7,000 dollars per every person in the US (Reiman). This amount is more than enough to
cover the majority of people's direct health costs, and then some. Reiman makes the
argument that the disconnect between amount funneled into the system, and the quality
and quantity of care provided lies in the business side of private insurance. Due to the
highly fragmented and discontinuous billing and payment procedures, as well as the
business costs associated with operating a for-profit firm in a competitive sector, nearly
20 percent of total healthcare spending does not make it to the actual treatment of patients
(Reid 195). Instead it contributes to the waste of the system.
Service coverage from the single payer would include all those relevant and
proven treatments prescribed by physicians. This would include all services such as
ambulatory and inpatient services, acute and long-term care, and drugs, psychiatric care,
and home care. A medical advisory board would determine those treatments that are
ineffective or deemed as voluntary, or the more minor luxuries within healthcare, such as
private hospital beds, and these services would not be covered by the single-payer.
Individuals would have the option of obtaining insurance outside the single-payer in
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addition to the services provide by the single-payer. This would be an added expense to
the individual. However, these external insurance networks would be non-competitive to
the single-payer plan in services covered. Physicians would be paid by the single-payer
on a salary basis through Physician Group Practices(PGP) which could be grouped
however seems fitting to PGP board members. These payments would be determined by
management and negotiated upon a contractual basis. The group executives could then
determine whether individual bonuses are appropriate.
Services provided by the group would be reimbursed upon submission of an
objective and group-level list of services and number of patients treated. The submission
of these forms would be cumulative and depersonalized so as to avoid fragmentation and
limit possibilities for billing fraud. The submissions would be electronically registered to
avoid the subjection of a committee and the headaches and conflicts of interest that would
be inherent in such a reimbursement system. Dr. Reiman defers the decision of whether
or not to implement user fees on an individual basis in order to avoid the long-term
consequences that tend to accompany co-payments.
However, the accompanying shifts of the provider-level would be necessary to
maximize benefits of a per-capita payment system. To allow physicians to treat patients
in the manner that they think is best for the patient, uninfluenced by external pressures,
they must be organized in a way that allows them to do so. This would mean the creation
of single-specialty partnerships with community-based multi-specialty PGPs(Reiman).
He cites the successes of group-model HMOs in such endeavors. He then goes on to say
that primary care physicians would be paid a salary with shifting bonuses, while
specialists will be paid variously.
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PGPs would mainly be comprised of cooperative groups of 50 to 100 physicians
to support no more than 1,500 patients per physician, so there would be practices ranging
in size from 75,000 to 150,000 patients. The appropriate support staff would of course
also be present. Rural areas would therefore just employ smaller numbers of physicians
to cover fewer patients. This would therefore provide a frcimework for providing group
based rural care, which is critical for rural states, especially those states with a poor rural
population, like Mississippi. Physicians would be paid a varying share of 10 to 12
percent of their practice's funding from the single-payer. This proportion would be
earmarked to the physicians because it would be the equivalent of what private practice
physicians take home after all fees and costs of operation are deducted from whatever
they receive from insurance in the present day system (Reiman).
All of these practices would be connected electronically through electronic
information technology. This electronic resource would hold a group publicly
accountable for treatments and services provided. The electronic record would be
accessible by the single-payer, as well as the general public. The idea being that it would
give the general public some reference to the quality of services provided by that group
as well as its success and failure.
Because profit is excluded from his system, no room is left for the business
expenses associated with profit growths, such as advertisement and PR. Therefore all net
revenues would be put towards facility and service improvement, but could not be used to
supplement physician salaries. Therefore, salaries would be set by the groups’ executive
committee, as approved by the governing national agency(Reiman).
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Patients are given the freedom under the plan to choose facilities and physicians
based on reputation and needs of the individual. They are also free to seek out specialists
that operate under the plan. The option to go outside the plan and pay out of pocket also
exists. This means that physicians can operate their own private practice, but they must
be entirely independent of the single-payer plan, in order to avoid the conflicts of interest
that would abound if they were to operate under both systems(Reiman 123).
In order to regulate and oversee such a large and potentially profitable industry
and to insure the integrity of the medical ethics system, a large but publically accountable
agency would need to be created. It would be created by legislation and held accountable
to congress but its operations would be maintained independent from the political system.
The experts leading the National Medical Care Agency(NMCA)would be nominated
and selected based upon individual expertise. These leaders would be supported by
administrators and other professionals that would allow for a decentralization of the
agency in order to accurately represent the diversity and diffusion of the US. The NMCA
would essentially conglomerate and simplify the smaller agencies already in existence for
healthcare. The NMCA would remain independent of all employment situations of
patients, and would only have an administrative and judicial influence on the system. It
would make decisions about the eligibility of treatments, facilities, and staff. The NMCA
would not determine which goods or drugs were prescribed by the individual physicians,
but would negotiate prices with manufacturers(Reiman).
Overall, Reiman believes this plan addresses all current problems of waste in the
health care system. It does this by increasing transparency, eliminating biased and profitoriented treatments, and minimizing overhead costs of fragmented private and public
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insurance.

The combined savings from the insurance and the medical care delivery

sectors could easily amount to at least 30 percent of present expenses.”(Reiman 129) It
also attempts quality control by reducing financial influences on physicians, to allow
them to treat patients based solely on the patients' best interests. Thus, according to
Reiman, this plan of action will allow for universal coverage that is of a higher quality,
less expensive, and more convenient for the Americcin population.

EXPECTED RESULTS
In the present day, the system is set up to incentivize the treatment of patients, rather than
the curing of their illnesses. This is especially prevalent in the treatment of type 2
diabetes, which has proven to be a largely controllable disease if the right combination of
medical services, treatments, and lifestyle changes are implemented. The individual
patient is at the hands of the expertise of their doctors, and the willingness of their thirdparty payers to pay the price. However, the third party payers' willingness to pay the
price has begun to evaporate with the ever-increasing costs of treating chronic diseases.
Reiman explicitly outlines the disparity in the interests of both the insurers and the
physicians, "Out-of-pocket expenditures account for less than one-fourth of total health
expenditures; the rest is paid by third parties, usually insurers, who do not personally
receive, or benefit from, the care being given.”(Reiman 47)There is no room for
maneuvering left for the actual patient. Ever}4hing has been decided for them, and
without any real input from them, and the only interests that could exist to control costs
have begun to respond to the incredible increase in spending by limiting their insurance
investments. The major payers, government and business, are now attempting to control
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costs by reducing insurance obligations because they are falling prey to the growing costs
of chronic disease treatment. This has served to increase the number of underinsured and
uninsured citizens, especially in poor, rural states like Mississippi. The rest of the
chapter will be devoted to explaining the direct effects that his proposed legislation
would have on the diabetic population of Mississippi.
If the system Reiman proposed were wholly implemented in Mississippi it would
completely change the face of medical treatment of chronic disease patients. There
would be less incentive for tertiary-level care because the physician would not be making
any more profit per amount of time spent than if they were simply talking with the patient.
This means that a physician, who’s time spent with patient directly correlates with how
successful their patient is in managing their own diabetes, would not be financially
harmed by the opportunity cost of the time taken with that individual. If physicians are
paid mainly on a salaried basis, they are no longer tempted to increase their income by
adding costs to the system by prescribing expensive treatments. Also, with the bonuses
that are based on the physicians success, as determined by metrics related to patients’ and
physicians’ success in the management of their diabetes, the physician will no longer care
about how to treat the patient, but how to keep them healthy. The less that they see have
to see the patient, the more successful, therefore the larger their bonus.
PGPs would also be forced to compete on a service basis, but be operating under
fixed budgeting as imposed by the single payer. This means that they will have aggregate
and simplify the care of diabetics in an efficient manner, not only to save administrative
costs, but also to improve the outlook of the patient through continuous primary-level
care. If a diabetic patients’ illness worsens, the group will be forced to employ more
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expensive equipment and services associated with tertiary care, thus taking from their
budget. This would therefore incentivize the use of more primary care services and
efficient provider practices to improve the patients’ outlook.
The problem of access to care in rural Mississippi under current practice is one
that is highly reliant upon charitable care as well as government sponsored CHC s. As
addressed in the introductory chapter, such clinics are highly successful, but are not
common enough to address the problem of access to care in MS. PGPs address this
problem by changing the budget structure for rural clinics to help subsidize the costs of
operating a clinic in a rural area that may not have as many patients available. This
would allow for fewer physicians groups to be able to afford smaller clinics because they
are not threatened by the overhead costs of private practice in rural areas with a smaller
patient pool.
This system would also improve the incentive structure for primary-care providers
to treat in these areas with proportionally lower income levels the same way they would
in more affluent areas of Mississippi. Providers would be compensated at the same

rate

as if they were treating wealthier individual. This means that those uninsured and
underinsured populations would have a much greater opportunity to access primary

care

for their diabetes, therefore preventing complications that would force them to an
emergency room. This is a compounding process that costs Mississippi’s public medical
budget millions every year(MS Fact Sheet). However, Reiman’s system does not
provide any incentives for practicing in rural areas. This issue will be addressed in
greater detail in the conclusive chapter of the thesis.
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The more urban population of Mississippi would also have greater access to
primary care because of the changed incentive structure. Due to PGP’s desire to compete
on a cost-saving basis, they will employ primary care physicians at a higher rater than
more expensive tertiary care providers. This would realign the proportion of physicians
operating in Mississippi to mimic the demands of the large diabetic population, rather
than an artificial incentive structure that favors acute treatment for chronic care. In
theory, this would result in a less expensive treatment structure for chronic disease
patients because of the aggregation of care in PGPs in order to provide, efficient and
continuous care to diabetics to prevent expensive and disreputable complications for the
individual clinics. In more urban areas, the PGPs, as well as individual physicians and
specialists, would be forced to compete on outcome as well as efficiency and simplicity
of care. The reputation these clinics would quickly develop in urban areas would result
in competition to attract patients because the clinics are reimbursed per patient. The
clinics will therefore be independently recruiting highly competent and successful
physicians and specialists through offering transparent salaried bonuses as determined by
the specific PGP group in order to attract more patients. Thus individuals of urban areas
not only have access to care regardless of income or insurance level, but they are also
empowered with the ability to choose providers based on their performance. This would
give diabetics a choice in their care providers, thus the specific care they will receive,
rather than being forced to see a specific physician as dictated by insurance coverage, or
lack of coverage in general.
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PROBLEMS OF SINGLE-PAYER HEALTHCARE
There are some major gaps in Reiman’s proposal regarding diabetics. When only certain
treatments are reimbursed by the single-payer, there is little room for innovation with
complex cases. This will directly affect those individuals whose diabetes has progressed
into a more sophisticated management phase, or those individuals whose diabetes is
coupled with other diseases, like hypertension, a commonly associated disease. By
limiting both physicians and patient’s choice in their care, the individual is left prey to the
system. This would limit the innovations that US healthcare is particularly good at.
Treatment of complex cases would thus be constrained by a single-payer system. This
would affect a relatively small percentage of diabetics in Mississippi, yet unless the
individuals were to go outside the system for more advanced and experimental care, they
would be left with no alternative. Therefore some of the more affluent diabetics might
afford such treatment, resulting in major inequalities of care if diabetes does reach more
complex stages. The single-payer reimbursement structure for highly complex care could
end up looking something like the infamous ‘death panels’ of insurance companies today.
They would have to make decisions about the cost of treatment in considering whether to
pay the higher costs and whether the likelihood of success and recovery are likely enough
to justify the cost to the system. However, the resultant panel would have less interest in
cost minimization for their own selfish interests, as insurance ‘death panels’ do under the
current system.
The second major gap involving Reiman’s proposal is that of the lack of any
constraint of demand on the patient side of treatment. No costs of obtaining treatment are
felt in any way, so decisions about treatments would be left to physicians. Conversely,
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physicians would face little incentive to provide extraneous care if they deem it so. There
would be no way for patients to receive such care within the system if they feel they need
it, but cannot find a physician willing to provide it. Again, it leaves the individual prey to
the economics of the system and the expertise of their physicians. This is a lesser evil
than the financial incentives at play in the current system, but is still not to be overlooked.

SUMMARY
Overall, the numerous and diverse diabetic population of Mississippi would be wellserved by a single-payer system in theory. However, how this would operate in practice
is yet to be seen. By eliminating financial incentives in healthcare treatment, the ethics of
a more equitable system are able to operate. This would be highly beneficial to the
individuals in Mississippi because of the ease involved in obtaining the primary care that
would maintain a normalized quality of life, as well as preventing the fiscally and
physically devastating complications associated with diabetes.
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IV. The Market-Driven Argument
Dr. Regina Herzlinger has spearheaded the campaign of the market-driven
healthcare system since the late nineties. The logic of the market driven cure is that the
consumer, by way of informed decision-making and purchasing power, will drive down
healthcare costs. Transparency causes what the economists call productivity, meaning
that we get fair value in exchange for our money."(Herzlinger 3) In this chapter the
villains of the current system’s woes will be identified according to Herzlinger, then the
solutions she proposes will be summarized, and finally the proposals will be applied to
their efficacy in controlling the diabetes epidemic in Mississippi.

FAULTS OF THE SYSTEM
Herzlinger is very critical of all of the contributors to the healthcare fiasco in her book
"Who Killed Healthcare?" She attacks the insurers, general hospitals, employers, US
Congress, and academics. Essentially, in her view, it is everyone's fault but the
consumers and the physicians because they have been left to fight for themselves with no
economic protection. The consumers' health has been taken out of their hands, and
placed under the care of several complex economic and politico-social forces, rather than
the medical sciences and professionals that would be able to help them.
The first and most blatant attack she makes is on the insurance industry. An
example is made of Kaiser Permanente. It started off as an innovative and efficient
treatment system that vertically integrated physicians, hospitals, and insurance firms with
each other, and with prepayment. This structure allowed for cooperation of medical
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interests towards the goal of helping the patient, while also minimizing costs for both the
patient and the system. The prepaid package for physicians incentivized the use of
preventative and primary care to keep the patient healthy rather than reliance on
treatment reimbursement for payments. This was a very successful model in the late
1980's and attempts at mimicking were made, mostly unsuccessfully. Most of the HMOs
that were established, such as US Healthcare, to imitate Kaiser's success were set up as a
cost saving outlet for insurance companies, but were not actually cooperative with
insurance companies. If the HMO's goal was to cure the patient, the insurance company's
goal was to treat the patient in a cost-minimizing manner. Such HMOs were a failure in
their attempt at fair, managed care and resulted in an unhealthy system of cost-savings in
order to maximize insurance profits. There were no ethical bounds in the system.
Physicians were frustrated at the minimal coverage for aged populations and those with
chronic diseases. The people that need continuous care most were excluded from the
system. The gate-keeping role that insurance payers placed on the system put the
purchasing power in their hands rather than the doctors or the patients (Herzlinger 50)
Obviously, this practice was not acceptable for long, and the insurance companies
adapted to the growing demand for choice and management of care for chronic diseases.
The switch was made to the preferred provider organization (PPO). This gave patients
the ability to choose to receive treatment from hospitals or doctors of their individual
preference, but only those 'preferred providers' would cost less for patients. Under the
guise of 'Disease Management' they proposed to manage care from their corporate offices.
This gave insurers control over how hundreds of thousands of independent physicians,
medical technology and research firms, and hospitals provided medical care to the patient
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with chronic disease. The motivations and interests for such initiatives were entirely
misaligned and did not result in any evidence of successful cost management (Herzlinger).
This causes care to be put in the hands of academia and bureaucrats rather than in the
hands of those whose interests are most synonymous with the health of the patients, the
physicians. By allowing profit-driven insurance power to choose treatment, chronic care
patients were left with the least expensive treatment, rather than the most effective.
Herzlinger also notes some of the innovations that resulted from the lack of
success of the preceding plans. The 'traditional' insurance plan covered everything
regarding the treatment, not just the expenses that the individual could not afford. These
gave individuals with chronic disease less incentive at maintaining their drug regimens
than would a 'high-deductible plan'. The logic behind such an argument being that the
patients would operate under the rationale, "If I catch an issue early, I will save money in
the long term.

She states that first-dollar (traditional) plans would "disconnect the user

from the cost of health care. Fully insured patients might feel that their health care is free
and become careless about how much they use or whether a provider gives them good
values" (Herzlinger 55). She continues to demonstrate the aggregate costs to the health
systems of such practices by citing an article by Amy Finkelstein, an MIT economist,
whose findings suggested that the majority of increases in insurance premiums could be
attributed to "increased availability of first-dollar-coverage insurance" (Herzlinger 55).
The expected impact of lowering death rates was not seen. The only effect that the
traditional plan had was to lower out-of-pocket payments by individuals. She then makes
the logical connection that this must mean that by allowing individuals to feel some of
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the costs of their care, they will hold greater incentives for maintaining their health.
Insurance would then be responsible for covering only catastrophically high costs.
Killer-number-two for Herzlinger are the hospitals. US hospitals are more
expensive than those in other countries similar to our own, such as Germany (Herzlinger).
This is due to innovations in the way the hospitals are managed. The hospitals were
worth 1 trillion in 2006 and growing in size and number(Herzling 61). However, they
were being used less. Hospital prices in 2004 grew six times more than the growth in
their utilization. She blames the empire builders that have taken advantage of potential
growth that is possible when the demand for care is virtually unrestrained and blind. It is
common knowledge that the uninsured get charged far more for their treatment at
hospitals than the insured. This perverse payment system bankrupts those who were
already most likely unemployed, and keeps them from receiving the most basic care.
This is especially dangerous and confounding for those with chronic disease. The cost of
treatment could be limited by preventative and primary care, but because of the hospitals'
gouging of these individuals, their diseases worsen and quickly become acute and life
threatening and therefore force individuals into the ER for acute care. Not to mention,
this practice adds far more expenses for treatment for all parties involved.
Hospitals are able to generate this kind of profit at the hands of the consumers
because of the lack of competition in the market. This has been reinforced by mergers of
major hospital networks, resulting in a decrease of the number of hospitals by more than
20 percent between 1970 and 2005 under the guise of developing economies of scale
(Herzlinger). What these mergers actually achieved was to increase the number of people
that could no longer afford health insurance by 5.5 million between 1990 and 2003 due to
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the increase costs of treatment at such facilities. Trust-busting proved unsuccessful. As
hospital chains were taken to court on charges of their artificial restraint of supply in
certain communities they made claims of their good intentions to lower costs by creating
economies of scale, and were successful.
There is also the issue of the vertical integration that some hospitals have
achieved in their communities by eliminating independent physicians' practices. The
physicians of these practices are key developers of managerial and operation efficiencies
that allow them to operate a maximum capacity and efficiency. Thus providing
continuous, quality care at a lower cost to their patients. This is especially prevelant in
their treatment of highly specialized diseases, like diabetes because of the continuity and
consistency of care throughout the networks that the physicians implement based on the
requirements of the specific disease or service provided.
Herzlinger’s third target is the employers, who have been charged with the task of
purchasing and allocating health insurance. Of course. Congress indirectly mandates
their responsibility in this matter. By making health insurance purchases made by the
employers tax-exempt, and levying a heavy tax on individually purchased insurance.
Congress limits the choice of insurance plans to those chosen and provided by the
individuals’ employer, if they have one. This is a highly perverse system that only allows
economic problems to directly affect the health of uninsured populations. This helps to
explain part of the growing socioeconomic gap in health status in Mississippi. In some
estimates, this tax subsidy in 2006 alone represented hundreds of billions of dollars
(Herzlinger 99).
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Of course, business interests aren’t necessarily aligned with the employee’s health
insurance satisfactions, and tend to be more simplicity and money-saving-oriented. Thus,
the choices that employees are typically given in their health insurance is extremely
limited in order to achieve volume-based discounts for the employers from the health
insurance companies that get their business. The options are further bottlenecked by
state’s regulations of insurance requirements. There are required benefits that all
insurance must carry in order to be sold to insurers in a given state, as dictated by that
state. That means that there are really no ‘small’ plans or reduced cost and coverage
choices for employees.
Customers are therefore left completely subject to decisions made by their
companies for them, and these decisions result in care that is dictated to them by
insurance companies. They do not directly perceive that they are making purchases,
which causes them to behave in an artificially price-shielded manner. They do not pay
attention to what they are being billed for because the final payer is the insurance
company according to their understanding. What they do not necessarily think about is
that they could be indirectly paying much more for treatment because as healthcare
becomes more expensive (due to the extraneous charges to insurers, for instance) the
premiums are then responsively increased by insurance agencies to compensate for the
losses. This means that businesses in the United States are paying an increasingly large
proportion of their employment budgets to insurance companies,further limiting both the
number and the value ofjobs that are available to the American workforce.
Overall, the insurance companies were behaving as rational actors in a liberal
market economy, except that they were absorbing the entire sector through monopolistic
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practices that were promoted by misguided and diluted policy. Their incentives are to
maximize profit by cutting costs, while also artificially raising their prices. Of course,
they would not have been able to survive in a tme competitive environment, which is
why they had to have some help from policy-makers. This happens to be Herzlinger's
next target.
Representatives are meant to protect and serve the interests of their constituency,
not their own pocketbooks and campaigning funds. It appears that the latter of these two
interests have won out in critical junctures in the government's management of the
healthcare industry. This section of the book is especially relevant to diabetes treatment
in Mississippi. Kidney failure has become an increasingly large problem as diabetes
complications wreak havoc on the population, both physically and fiscally. Current
dialysis for kidney patients averages $65,000 a year £ind private insurance only covers the
first 33 months of treatment (Herzlinger 115). The rest is covered through Medicare
funds. This sounds like it is a very generous and life-saving subsidy, however, when
closely examined it is the opposite. The Congressional oversight of kidney treatment has
resulted in tripled expenditures from $5.1 billion in 1991 to $18.4 billion in 2004.
Incredibly, these increases didn't result in healthier patients. This is because the
treatment prescribed by Congress excluded the preventative care that would slow disease
progression. In fact, one of the dmgs that was prescribed, Epogen, had some devastating
side effects that resulted in the deaths of many patients (Herzlinger 117). There were
some winners in this scenario, and they included the CEOs of dialysis centers like DaVita
and biotechnology firms like Amgen that manufactures Epogen. They spent a combined
7.1 million dollars lobbying the US congress in the first half of 2006, which resulted in a
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projected $100 million increase to dialysis providers (Herzlinger 121). The details of the
payment patterns in summary were this: more of the less expensive and less effective
treatments, conglomeration of many independent dialysis centers, and a flat sum payment
for nephrologists which resulted in less personal care per patient.
All of this was secondary to the protection that Congress granted Amgen and it's
drug Epogen 'orphan drug' status, giving it a monopoly on the production of the drug. No
competing drugs could be sold for seven years, along with major tax cuts for the
corporation. By 2005, Epogen sales reached $3 billion, $2.4 billion of which was
purchased directly by Medicare (Herzlinger 122). Not only did Congress protect Epogen,
it also made it more heavily prescribed by mandating an increase in the upper bounds of
the hematocrit measurement by 3 percent. It would require 50 percent more Epogen to
reach this level. All of this was implemented without reliable scientific evidence of the
necessity of an increase in hematocrit levels of kidney patients.
The final problem that Herzlinger finds with congressional oversight of medical
treatments has now expanded by way of pay-for-performance measures. The issue here
is that the medical system has no consistent performance metrics, so the government has
resorted to a system of paying for adherence to a list of procedures approved by the
government. This pays for the treatments, rather than the outcomes for the Medicare
patients. The payment process is a misnomer. These dictated treatment processes are
inflexible and limit doctors' ability to treat patients to the best of their ability. The
congressional treatments are based upon recent research, which is often flawed and
disproven within a few years of publication. Also, the complications compound for
patients with comorbidities (multiple diseases), which is very common among diabetes

50

patients. Their treatment has to be as personalized and specific as their physicians can
provide. This does not happen as a result of congressionally mandated treatments,
according to Herzlinger. This does not just affect Medicare patients because most private
insurance companies base their reimbursement schemes off Medicare's outline for
payable treatments.
Herzlinger’s fifth and final attack is directed at academics, and specifically those
promoting the ‘utopian’ ideals of a single-payer system, like Dr. Reiman. She argues that
the single-payer system would eliminate all competition and suppress innovation through
cost controls. These cost controls will eventually lead to waiting lists and inaccessibility
for the consumers of care. She then explains the classic example of the horrors of the
infamous Canadian medical system, and how the single-payer system has resulting in few
getting access to care but many being put on long waiting lists. "By 2006, the average
waiting time to see a specialist was more than four months,90 percent longer than in
1993"(Herzlinger 144). Another statistic she presents is that the correlation between
socioeconomic status and incidence of many common cancers is just as strong in Ontario
as in the US, indicating a failed attempt at true equality of care, which is a key ethical
pillar of Reiman’s argument.
Her final criticism of Reiman's proposals is that the consumer would be more
intelligent and informed about healthcare if they had purchasing power and the
transparency necessary to know what is going on. Though people do not fully understand
how many complex products operate, they can still appreciate high from low quality
products. Herzlinger argues that the same would be true for healthcare consumption if

51

patients were given the incentive to demand high quality/low cost care, as well as the
transparency to make such determinations.

PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE
Regina Herzlinger's 'killers' of healthcare are in some ways similar to Dr. Reiman's, in
that, like Dr. Reiman, she places most of the blame on political institutions and policy
makers as well as lopsided and cloaked greed of insurance and hospital chains. However,
while Reiman also targets physicians, the heroes of her story include the physicians,
entrepreneurs, innovators, capitalism, and the empowered consumer. Therefore, her
prescription for changing the system revolve in reducing political and institutional
constraints, while also offering consumers greater purchasing power as well as the
transparency required to make informed decisions. This, she argues, is the only way to
simultaneously reduce costs and improve quality of care in the United States.
Herzlinger would have her ideal healthcare system activated by only allowing
artificial subsidies to provide insurance for the uninsured. The rest of the current
healthcare subsidies would be eliminated. The employed consumer would be given the
money to purchase health insurance from their employers tax-free. The consumer would
then be free to shop around various insurance providers to find the most fitting plan with
the cost that works for the consumer and their family. The individual would choose how
much they wanted to pay and what services would be rendered by their plans. The
variations in insurance plans would eventually give chronic disease patients everything
they could ask for of an insurance company because diversity would be demanded by
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individual purchasers, rather than the uniformity in plan options that mass purchases by
employers demands.
The second legislation that she proposes would be to implement a requirement of
all payers and providers to publish price and outcome metrics. This would give the
consumer the knowledge required to make informed decisions about how best to allocate
their resources to get the most quality for their money. These do not have to be complex
measures, and could be as simple as a percentage measure of healthy patients after some
procedure provided. This would hold insurers and care providers accountable for their
performance.
The third legislation that Herzlinger proposes relates to risk-adjustment. This
would not be an incentive to only treat sick patients, as it is today, but instead would
ensure that there would be no losses to providers who treat more expensive diseases.
This adjustment could be achieved by altering transfers to consumers,insurers, or
providers so that sick patients are worth more to treat so that the extra expense of treating
them is covered. Risk-adjustment for the individual would be problematic because to
provide the transparency that Herzlinger trumpets, the healthy individuals enrolled in an
insurance plan would be informed that of the $10,000 they pay for their insurance, they
only had $1,500 in health expenses for the year, whereas a transplant patient paid the
same amount, but their care for the year cost $85,000(Herzlinger). Instead, insurers
would be responsible for risk adjusting each other, and their efforts would be monitored
by a government agency to ensure accuracy.
The fourth and final legislation she suggests is one that is currently under
ideological fire. She proposes the requirement that everyone purchase health insurance.
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Those that are unemployed or cannot afford it would be subsidized by funds that would
have gone to hospitals that provide free care to these patients. Mitt Romney was a
leading proponent of this measure as Massachusetts’s governor (Herzlinger). This would
offer a large enough demand pool for many insurance companies to stay afloat amidst
major reform.
The most important part of these legislations is that they must all be simultaneous
and universal. Without universality, you end up with a change in demand, but not a
change in supply practices, or visa versa. This would look like the high-deductible
insurance plan that George W.Bush encouraged. The idea was that people would
demand less care if it was more expensive for the individual. These are less expensive on
a yearly basis, but they still cover the catastrophic care that puts so many individuals in
serious debt. It did lower healthcare expenditures, and may be a good option for some,
but for many a $2,000 deductible is far too expensive. Essentially, the entire middle class
would probably want something that looks much different. The principal of choice
provision given by the option of high-deductible policy was a step in the right direction,
and it did change demand. In fact, patients on the plan with a chronic disease either
maintained or improved their health status (Herzlinger). However,in order for necessary
reform to make real changes, the supply side also needs incentives to alter its practices.

EXPECTED RESULTS
If such reforms were implemented in Mississippi, there would be major alterations in the
provision of care, and the results would be various. There would be increases in
innovation, as market forces always enforce from the provider side of healthcare. The
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patient would also have more choice of where to allocate their medical spending between
insurance companies and providers. However,there are some serious implications for
relying solely on market forces in a mral, underinsured, and poor state like Mississippi.
For the remainder of the chapter, I will apply these reform proposals to the diabetic
citizens of Mississippi, both rural and urban, and of all employment and economic
backgrounds.
Herzlinger believes that these reforms will bring about three healthcare
innovations as a result of classic supply and demand forces:
“1. Health care focused factories will bring specialists and generalists into
one integrated "stop-and-shop" system of care.
2. Consumer-based medical records will create one information access
point for patients and providers.
3. Medical technology will be personalized for the needs of individual
patients” (Herzlinger)
These three innovations would essentially bring about Community Health Care networks
for the entire healthcare sector that are centered on one disease, like diabetes.
The focused factories that Herzlinger describes assimilate teams of care providers
into one practice whose purpose is toward a specific disease. This would be especially
beneficial for patients suffering from chronic diseases, like diabetes, that are often
coupled with other diseases. For instance, Herzlinger gives the example of a diabetes
treatment facility that synthesizes the work of endocrinologists,cardiologist, nephrologist.
dermatologists, podiatrists, behavioral support specialists, and others. This practice
would centralize care for diabetes in one location, making care for such a complex
disease much simpler. The problem of fragmentation in present-day has resulted in the
lacking of critical primary care for these patients. Specifically, "only 36 percent of fully
insured elderly diabetics had a crucially important test that measures long-term levels of
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sugar in the blood" (Herzlinger 168). An integrated regimen of treatments has already
been proven to improve the outcomes of treatments of diabetics. As has been described
in an earlier chapter, our health care system is not currently directed at the care of chronic
disease, yet these diseases are the most expensive, widespread, and incapacitating.
What's worse is that the number of individuals with these diseases is on the incline.
especially in Mississippi.
Consumer-driven markets would promote such firms because individual patients
would seek them out. She says these facilities would be more feasible than the fully
vertically integrated hospitals that are described in Dr. Reiman's book because of their
moderate size.

The expenditure on diabetes in an average state would enable the

construction of a number of 300-bed hospitals and hundreds of community facilities"
(Herzlinger 172). This number would be even higher in Mississippi because of the high
(and growing) proportion of the state with diabetes.
Integrated information records are a much-needed evolution in medical care that
would simplify and limit management costs. However, currently there are no incentives
in place for cooperation of care providers and payers to integrate patients' health records.
Electronic records would give patients more control over their care because they would
be enabled to manage their own records instead of relying upon other agents to shuttle the
information to other agents. Such integrated and comprehensive records would allow for
a simplified shopping experience for the individual, as well as reduced administrative
costs for providers.
Finally, innovations in technology would allow for a more personalized medical
experience for patients. This section is much less specific, but the basic ideology is that
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an increase in demand for more personal medical treatments will drive innovations in
both drugs and technology that would allow for simpler, cheaper, and more effective care.
Of course, for all of these innovations to exist, there must be a change in the
payment system. The insurance industry would be a central piece of the puzzle to
provide integrated care. They would have to provide an extension of the diversification
exemplified in the development of ‘focused factories’. As of 2006 three managed care
plans had most of the market but only had 10 % variation between them (Herzlinger 175).
These plans will be forced to differentiate into smaller and more personalized plans in
order to meet individual demands.
One result of the increased personal demands on insurance would be and increase
in those clinics that provide for integrated medical care for chronic diseases. "In a
consumer-driven health care system, provider teams will name their price for bundles of
care they create, reversing current, insurer-dictated prices for fragmented care and
enabling consumers to reward excellence."(Herzlinger 177) This kind of bundle would
be offered through a multi-year policy. This would therefore create a large incentive for
insurance companies to provide the kind of care that is helpful in the long term, rather
than the acute care that may be cheapest in an immediate situation. It would also provide
the necessary psychological support for individuals dealing with complex and
intimidating treatment and lifestyle regimens, like diabetics. If the patients are compliant.
they are healthier in the long run.
There would also be an option that provides insurance for catastrophic situations
in response to the expectation of the consumer to have protection from the financial
devastation that can be a result of medical disasters. These plans would cover all
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treatments prescribed (even those labeled as experimental) for the incidence of
catastrophic medical expense.
The final facet of these consumer demanded insurance plans is that they will be
more convenient for the individual and for the physicians and other care providers. If
insurance coverage is simplified and understood by patients then they are able to make
decisions and meet the expectations provided by their physicians for their health. Rather
than missing appointments or treatments because of insurance headaches, the care of the
individual would be entirely in the hands of the patient and physician, as it should be.

PROBLEMS OF MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTHCARE
However, there are some serious flaws in relation to the applicability of a market to an
area with little demand, such as rural Mississippi. Assuming that the underinsured and
uninsured will have access to basic insurance under Herzlinger’s proposed subsidies, they
would have the choice as to where and whom the want to treat them. However,
‘rationally behaving’ physicians under this system will steer clear of sparsely populated
areas. Especially if these individuals know that their consumer will most likely be
equipped with the most basic of insurance, as is the case in Mississippi. There are no
financial incentives that would encourage physicians to take on the overhead cost of
setting up a specialized diabetic ‘focused factory’ in the middle of the Mississippi Delta.
What would be left for these individuals is essentially whatever cheurity care can be
provided by independent organizations that can afford it. This does not leave the diabetic
empowered to manage their disease. Rather, the disease will progress, complications will
arise, and if the individual is lucky enough to make it to an ER in time, they will undergo
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painful, expensive, and potentially dangerous treatment to save their lives. Such
complications can leave these individuals severely handicapped and unable to work.
Thus worsening the economic gaps due to health problems on the aggregate in
Mississippi.
Herzlinger’s proposals also make the assumption that people will choose to spend
their healthcare money to insure their diabetes independently, thus behaving like rational
economic actors. However, in poor states like Mississippi, it is unlikely that in a family
of four, the breadwinner will forgo insurance for his children in order to purchase a
chronic care plan that is tailored for his disease. Though individuals would be able to
make choices regarding their level of care based on their needs, they would have to
consider the allocations that they are making in a rationally manner. However, when it
comes to something as profoundly important as healthcare, people do not make
economically rational decisions. If the breadwinner of a family were managing their
advanced type 2 diabetes, there is a small probability of an incapacitating complication
that could potentially leave an entire family without income. Ideally, he would use his
healthcare budget to purchase a more expensive insurance plan tailored for his diabetic
care. In this family there is also a child with severe asthma whom could greatly benefit
from a similar chronic care plan tailored for his/her specific needs. This family is also
operating under average financial restraints (they do not have the luxury of being able to
afford both specified insurance plans). The parent would be forced to make a decision of
allocation of their family health insurance budgeting, which would likely lead to the
choice of protecting their child first. However, this would leave the breadwinner without
the insurance that would cover the care that would ensure no diabetic complications
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occurred. This family, if the breadwinner is unable to work due to complications, would
not only have to foot a significant portion of the bill uncovered by their basic insurance to
save his/her life, but they would also now be without income, and force onto disability
payments. Thus costing the system, and the family, significantly more than if they had
made the economically rational decision to insure the breadwinner. Healthcare, by nature.
is not as coldhearted and calculated as other economic purchases, which refutes a pillar
on which Herzlinger’s arguments are based. The demand for necessary healthcare is
unbound on the individual level by economic forces. Therefore the market system is
defunct by an unlimited demand of a scarce supply market.
The final critical issue that is ignored by Herzlinger’s system is how to promote
the transition to primary care in order to reduce the expense associated with tertiary care.
Her system promotes fragmentation at the hands of market forces related to diseases and
specific treatments or services provided. However, the eschewed pa5mient structure of
physicians in the US, and Mississippi specifically, is ignored. So then why would any
medical student operating under the fragmented, but efficient ‘focused factory’ system
ever go into general practice or family medicine? The obvious long-term result of such a
system would be complete evaporation of primary care providers in exchange for a lot
more endocrinologists and nephrologists, even to provide the most basic and simplistic of
care to individual diabetics who are able to manage their diabetes with only the most
superficial preventative care. There are no incentives to maintain a primary care status in
a focused system like the one Herzlinger provides.
The argument directly correlated to the issue of primary physicians being forced
out by the system is that no consumers would even want to see a primary care physician.

60

if they have the option to skip straight to the tertiary-level simplicity of a focused factory.
The gatekeeping by primary care physicians to reach tertiary care levels is nonexistent
and will cause treatment for the most basic of problems to be moved into tertiary territory.
thus costing the individual, and entire system much more.

SUMMARY
Herzlinger argues that by giving the consumer the right and ability to make their
own healthcare purchases, payers and providers of care will be forced to innovate in
order to cater to a more individual demand. This innovation will force prices down and
help slow the growing costs of medicine in the US. In order to achieve these efficiencies,
the health services sector must become as transparent as all other sectors of a capitalist
economy are. This empowerment will give the individual control over their own health.
and in theory, also reduce costs by lowering the amount of unnecessary use of expensive
services by allowing consumers to economically feel the cost of care, rather than be
completely shielded from all costs. However, these arguments are based on the
assumption that consumers will act in an economically rational way, which is not always
the case. Also, the reform proposal seems to exacerbate the problems of healthcare
access to rural areas, which is already a critical problem for rural Mississippians. Lastly,
little mention is made about general primary care provisions and how this would fit in the
system, indicating that the US would become increasingly reliant on tertiary care in
exchange.
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V. CONCLUSION
There is no denying the fact that Healthcare reform should be at the forefront of
political discussions on a national level. We,as a country, spend more money on
healthcare than the size of the GDP of China in its entirety, and still have many public
health outcomes that are on par with Cuba. This issue is a product of a multitude of
political, social, and economic forces at play in the US system. All factors should be
holistically addressed by healthcare reform in an immediate fashion.
As has been amply demonstrated, Mississippi’s unique cocktail of a high
prevalence of diabetes and other chronic diseases, rural residents, and uninsured or
underinsured population, has served to magnify the inefficiencies and inequalities of the
healthcare system. In the US, people with a yearly income below $10,000 are three to six
times as likely to die before the age of sixty-four as those with an income over $25,000
(Reid 162). This is a discouraging statistic for a state that is leading in both poverty and
obesity rates. Much of this poverty and health correlation is related to access of care.
which is compounded in Mississippi by the large rural population. For healthcare reform
to be effective and sustainable it should be widespread enough to reach those groups that
are marginalized by the present-day system. These individuals include rural.
underinsured/uninsured, and the chronically ill. It is for this reason that Mississippi
provides an excellent case for examining the efficacy of the two reform proposals.
Diabetes patients, by the nature of their disease, can maintain a normal lifestyle
with some basic primary and preventative care at a low cost to the system. Thus, as a
disease, diabetes is representative of the flaws of the system as a whole to provide the
cost-saving primary care to the patient. Once again, the US system lags behind the rest of
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the world in this indicator as well. American diabetics have a shorter life expectancy
than in any other developed country (Reid 31). Obviously, there are some drastic
changes that need to be made in an expedient manner to avoid the complete collapse of
16 % of the US GDP,and possibly more due to spillover.
It is for this reason that Dr. Arnold Reiman and Regina Herzlinger have made
reform proposals that are intended to completely alter the way America provides care.
They are based on opposing basic philosophies, as well as practicality measures. Dr.
Herzlinger’s book. Who Killed Healthcare?, blames the current woes of our current
healthcare system on lack of transparency and monopolistic practices of the big industry
involved that have served to create a pseudo-market system in which the demand is
completely subjected to the whims of the supply side of healthcare. In other words, the
patients and physicians are left completely unprotected by market forces that are
financially driven, rather than allowing the consumers to choose care based on the
differentiated needs of the individual. Dr. Arnold Reiman,in his book,A Second Opinion,
blames the economic incentives that are associated with market practices in healthcare for
the largely unethical practices of all suppliers of care. His solution involves stripping
these profit-driven incentives from the payment side of medical care altogether by
implementing a single-payer system that is centered around universal allocation of funds.
thereby eliminating discrimination on care based upon individual economic status.
After performing an analysis of the current upwards trending of the diabetic
population, as well as the complications and expenses associated with disease, it is
obvious that any system that is implemented should address this epidemic foremost by
providing the care that will keep the individual healthy, rather than only saving them
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once they are very sick. This is especially true in Mississippi, where a large percent of
the population lives in rural areas that are devoid of specialist care. Not only that, but
Mississippi's population is more reliant on Medicare/Medicaid funds, as well as
charitable acute care, than the rest of the country (Kaiser).
Though both proposed healthcare reform proposals offer cost saving mechanisms.
while improving quality, and insuring transparency, they both have serious drawbacks.
Thus the choice must be made between the lesser of three evils: do nothing and remain on
the currently declining path of the industry, allowing market driven forces free reign, or
limiting diversity and competition through implementation of a single-payer. The current
highly fragmented and polar political climate of the US has not committed itself and will
not commit itself to complete reform without a fallout that awakens the public and
policy-makers to the necessity of immediate conciliatory action. Hopefully a consensus
can be reached before such a situation arises, not only for the good of the healthcare
sector, but also for the good of the entire US population and economy. Barring the
obvious political impossibilities associated with the powerful interests currently
entrenched in the status quo, such as insurance conglomerates, pharmaceutical producers.
and hospital chains, the most direct reform proposal in addressing the diabetes epidemic
in Mississippi is that of Dr. Reiman’s single-payer system. The rest of this chapter is
structured to outline the strengths and deficits associated with the single-payer system.
and how they paint a more positive future for Mississippi diabetics than the strengths and
deficits of the market-driven system, then I briefly outline a moderating compromise
between the two systems to attempt to further improve outlook.
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STRENGTHS OF THE SINGLE-PAYER SYSTEM
The single-payer system operates with the moral assumption that healthcare is a
universal right, which is coherent with the general public’s opinion in the US. According
to pollsters, when the general public was asked “Do you think everybody has a right to
medical care when they get sick?” 85 percent of respondents affirmed this ethic (Reid
185). However, there is a large disconnect with this morality of the public and
operations of the current system, in which 46 million Americans are uninsured. Though
both reform proposals offer a universal coverage solution, the single-payer is the only one
that offers a defined incentive structure for provision of basic primary care. By paying
doctors on a salary, PGPs eliminate the pressures on physicians associated with providing
expensive treatment in order to be compensated well, and also allow for those who once
were uninsured to be treated according to how the physician sees fit, rather than what that
individual can afford. This realignment of incentives has the entire system,from payers
to providers, operating with the goal of keeping the diabetic patients healthy, rather than
using expensive treatments to save them from complications, thus keeping the population
of Mississippi healthier, and simultaneously reducing costs to the system.
In order for this system to be fully functional in the US,and to maintain some of
the options for the more expensive and advanced care of which the US is so famed.
Reiman suggests an option to exit the single-payer structure and purchase private
insurance. This matter directly addresses those wealthy diabetics whose diseases have
advanced beyond the primary care level, and want more than what can be offered by the
single-payer’s specialists. This private sector would be non-competitive with the single
payer, and would only provide those services deemed unnecessary or too expensive for
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their returns by the single-payer system. The individuals opting to do so would still pay
into the single-payer network with a tax structure based on income,so whatever
insurance they purchase outside the network is an optional added expense to the
individual. This would create a much smaller private insurance pocket that would have
to be ultra-competitive in order to draw consumers that want to pay extra for the
extraneous services that are available in the private sector. Therefore, a much more
minor incentive structure would remain to innovate and develop treatments that, once
proven effective, could enter the single-payer system, so that the entire population has
access to this care. I will propose slight alterations to this idea later in the chapter to
provide a more extensive competitive private insurance market.
The single-payer system offers a means to eliminate the disincentives of
providing care to underserved populations, specifically Mississippi’s rural population.
By offering a greater subsidy per patient for PGPs that operate in designated rural areas.
the overhead costs of setting up and maintaining such a clinic are greatly reduced. Also,
because physicians will be recompensed based on number of patients, rather than the
return from their patients’ insurance, they are able to treat any and all of the poor
population based upon what will make them healthy, not what sparse Medicaid or
Medicare reimbursements will allow. However, Dr. Reiman does not provide an
incentive structure to get physicians to want to live and work in mral areas, something
that has been historically difficult to do, especially in the Mississippi Delta region.
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WEAKNESSES OF THE SINGLE-PAYER SYSTEM
Though Reiman’s proposals do offer structures by which all diabetics can access
at least the most basic care, there are some major problems with the implementation
practicality of such a large government entity to respond to the needs of a diverse
population of Americans that have grown increasingly reliant upon healthcare in order to
achieve and maintain good health status. In order to prevent external politics from
affecting healthcare, the single-payer committees would have to be independent of
political elections, and if they are subject to some kind of election, should serve much
longer terms than other public representatives, so that they have greater interest in the
long term of public health. The individuals of the committee would have to be
experienced, knowledgeable, and politically pliant so that good cooperative relations are
maintained within the committee. If these individuals were to represent all interests in
the system, they would be able to provide a system that meets the major demands of all
players. This would include the interests of insurance, pharmaceuticals, hospitals.
physicians, and the consumers.
The bulk source of the single-payer’s budget would be a tax directed specifically
at the program, rather than having it be subject to budgetary constraints of the federal
government, and the political whims of whatever party holds majority. The system
should only be monitored by the government, and operate independently of it. Reiman
does make these suggestions in his book, but he lacks specificity in how to maintain the
single-payer’s independence from political and economic trends. This is critical for the
reliability and consistency of the system, and deserves further specificity.
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Another critical issue that is inherent in Reiman's proposal is that of the
individuals not sensing of any of the costs associated with the care. If the individuals can
go to the clinic of their choice, to see the physician of their choice, who would treat the
patient for no cost to the patient, then no financial incentives exist to be vigilant in health
maintenance and not overuse the care that is readily available. The lack of transparency
associated with the not knowing the cost of care would lead to such situations in which
some diabetics would rely upon the expertise of their physicians to keep their diabetes
under control, rather than conscientiously monitoring it on their own. This cost shield is
a major problem that Herzlinger cites in her arguments for a market-driven system. The
individual that does not feel the costs of care won't be able to differentiate between the
different services being provided, and which is more or less expensive. In other countries
with a single payer entity, such as France and Japan, this issue is addressed by requiring
the patient to pay an upfront charge for whatever service they are receiving from one of
the physicians. The fee is varied based upon the actual cost of care. Though this charge
is mostly inexpensive and superficial, it forces the patient to consider that the services
that they are receiving do have a cost. This charge is then reimbursed in its entirety by
the single-payer within a couple of weeks. Of course, if the individual could not afford to
pay the charges, they would be covered by the single-payer upfront. It still forces the
patient to consider the costs. Though this is a seemingly minor detail of the system, it
would reminds individuals that there are costs associated with their healthcare, and that
these costs vary with the intricacy and complexity of the service offered.
As was mentioned earlier, the single-payer does not discourage rural primary care,
but it does nothing to encourage it. This manner needs to be addressed by reform.
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especially for the rural state of Mississippi. This gap could be addressed in a direct
manner through the single-payer system by mandating medical student rotations at rural
clinics that provide care to underserved populations by state schools. Not only would this
allow students exposure to a different clinical environment than what they would be used
to at a teaching hospital, possibly making it more appealing, but it would provide more
basic care to underserved areas on a temporary basis. The hope of such practice would
be that some students would regard mral practice with a more open-minded perspective.
which would make it more likely that they may want to practice in such areas upon
completion of medical training. There are currently pharmacy and nursing student
rotations that operate similarly to this, and these have proven successful in providing
services to rural areas.
A rural physician rotation program such as this could be feasibly implemented by
the single-payer because of universal incentives at reducing acute treatments at
emergency rooms in underserved areas. It would involve the interest of the general
taxpayer to subsidize a rural rotation program because it is a relatively low-cost way of
providing much-needed basic care to these areas. The fragmented market-driven system
would not be able to provide a uniform incentive to initiate a social program of this sort.
Nor would it have the cooperative involvement with state medical schools to financially
support these rotations.
Finally, the last major problem associated with Dr. Reiman's single payer system
is the lack of political wherewithal and clout to initiate such a universal and drastic
change. Essentially, Reiman would be eliminating the entire private health insurance
sector. He would also be limiting many of the current monopolistic practice of
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pharmaceuticals and hospitals. This would not sit well with a lot of powerful players that
have already lined the pockets of policy-makers, and will continue to do so in order to
maintain the status quo in which they are making a killing. These powerful entrenched
interests will make such a system impossible unless big business can no longer afford the
insurance premiums of their employees. This may not be too fantastical to picture
happening in the near future. Essentially, if the healthcare system fails, the entire
economy fails. This is not good for anyone involved, including major power players such
as insurance and pharmaceuticals. Reiman's argument relies upon this logic for the
likelihood of the passage of such drastic health reform, and he explicitly states that he
knows his single-payer system wouldn't be politically feasible without major perspective
shifts in the near future. It must be possible to accomplish reform before a major falling
out occurs. This is a major qualifier for designating practicality of a system, and one that
leaves Reiman’s proposal lacking. Of the three evils, the worst is that we, as a nation.
end up doing nothing. Thus, this is a danger of Reiman's reform; it won't be implemented
without failure of the system. The hope of some drastic political conciliation across
political parties, ideologies, and special interests seems entirely unrealistic in the current
political climate of the nation.

STRENGTHS OF THE MARKET-DRIVEN SYSTEM
The market-driven system does address some of the critical issues of the single-payer.
Namely, if market forces were left to adjust the actions of insurers, there is a strong
possibility that these insurance companies would provide a differentiated market that
addresses the needs of the individual in a way that allows for the consumer to make the
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choices related to their diabetes, rather than have these choices imposed upon them by a
single-payer. These insurance companies would then force providers to differentiate as
well, resulting in demand-driven provider networks that cater to the individual consumer.
The diabetic ‘focused factories' that would result would have strong financial incentives
to draw customers based on performance, as well as cost competition. In doing so, the
costs to the system would be theoretically reduced through the necessity of managerial
and biomedical innovations to reduce the costs of care.
Demand-oriented incentives could also revolutionize the other sectors of
healthcare. If pharmaceuticals and medical technologies were forced to adhere to a more
fluctuant demand, their products would correspondingly become less expensive and more
readily available to a mass market that has a more individualized demand because
individuals would be empowered to make decisions regarding care and insurance
allocations. This would be in exchange for the unitary markets that the relatively uniform
insurance companies provide by their limited technological and pharmaceutical
compensation. For those that could afford the goods as well as make economically sound
decisions about purchases, the effects of a demand-driven market place would result in a
more personalized medical experience. Those that could afford the more expensive
insurance plans that allow for purchases of the more high technology treatments would
find such diversification of the industry highly convenient and cost-effective. Once these
products have been on the market for a sufficient amount of time, the price will drop due
to developmental innovations that drive the cost of production down. This would then
increase the consumer market to include the basic insurers. However, when it comes to
care of diabetes, such innovation will be beneficial to those who are already reliant upon
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high-technology care to maintain their disease. Such forces do not address the need for
innovations of the primary treatment of diabetics, because as market-driven forces have
already demonstrated, not all services, drugs, or technologies are compensated at the
same rate. Because meeting the most lucrative demand would mean development of
those most invasive and expensive of innovations, developers will cater to these demands
first and foremost, adding cost to the system, and increasing individual reliance rates
upon such treatments. This is not the only problem associated with a market-driven
system for diabetic consumers. In the following section, the nature of the market-driven
system operating in a low demand market will be examined.

WEAKNESSES OF THE MARKET-DRIVEN SYSTEM
Regina Herzlinger’s market-driven reform would be insufficient for the diabetics of
Mississippi because of the high expense of the care that her proposal incentivizes, as well
as the necessity of the presence of strong demand forces to drive the innovations
necessary for her system to reduce costs. Though her proposals fit perfectly with the
demography of densely populated areas of individuals that are able to choose between
providers, they do not fit the general demography of Mississippi. Her reimbursement and
cost structure is based on three critically inapplicable notions:
1. People will always operate as reasonable economic actors when making
choices about consumption of healthcare
2. Market driven forces act universally in the US
3. By nature, capitalist markets do not create large gaps between the have
and have-nots, which in healthcare such gaps unethical if left unchecked.
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Her first assumption is based on the idea that individuals, when making decisions about
healthcare, consider and weigh all short and long term consequences in an economically
reasonable manner. If people always behaved in an economically reasonable manner.
then detrimental habits, such as smoking, would be a non-issue. If these individuals were
to behave in an economically rational manner, then yes, the market force of the
consequence of having to deal with future medical bills would cause them to put down
the cigarette. Yet, for whatever reason, people still make the conscious, informed
decision to smoke. Health is a continuous lifestyle decision rather than an isolated
economic decision.
Such health decisions are not limited to an individual level. There is also the case
of the family decision making processes that further fragmenting and differentiating
health insurance coverage would bring. As discussed in market-driven chapter, when
forced to make emotional decisions, families sacrifice the economic incentives in lieu of
the hope of extended life and well-being of those that they love.
The second critical problem with her assumptions is that is she doesn’t consider
those populations of the US that are not in close vicinity to a plethora of ‘focused
factories’ that would then be forced to compete to draw customers. As stated in the
introductory chapter of my thesis, there are some communities in Mississippi that must
drive 40 plus minutes to reach the nearest specialist clinic, and that is assuming that it is
the kind of specialist that they need. There are large disincentives, including overhead
costs and low density demand, to setting up CHC-like ‘focused factories,’ or even general
primary care clinics in rural areas under Herzlinger’s reform. This would further
exacerbate the issue of diabetes complications due to lack of adequate, continuous
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primary care for diabetics in Mississippi. Thus, adding high costs to the system when
these individuals are forced to enter tertiary-level emergency care, which can cost
millions per person and on aggregate, much more to the system as a whole.
The third major issue with Herzlinger’s reform is that market-driven forces
increase inequality indefinitely. As the providers morph to meet the new demands
present with the pure capitalistic market-driven healthcare, there will be inevitably be
greater compensation rates for certain types of clinics and specialties. Thus,the major
changes that would be made do not leave room for the ‘efficiency’ of primary care
practices. There are no adequate measures by which an individual would choose between
primary care providers. Her system would increase the rate of the current trending
towards specialty care in the US because there would be no niche left available for
general practitioners. This further limits primary care providers’ ability to reduce the
costs to the system that are associated with the use of more expensive specialty care for
the needs of primary care patients. This adds to the costs of the system by promoting the
use of specialty care and leaving general primary care to the whims of the market.
Because of the large incentives that are the result of private insurance compensations.
medical students will forgo becoming a primary care provider altogether.
This issue has a second facet, which relates to the cost-cutting nature that is
inherent in the insurance industry. Insurance companies, even if transparent, will limit
their expenditures so as to increase profit in the short term to appease investors. Though
she argues that by providing statistics about the health returns of their consumers this
would create a demand for long-term health, insurance companies would have little
incentive to think long-term in their care compensations, especially initially upon reform.

74

This is because a significant source of their capital comes in the form of short-term
investors. They cannot afford to sacrifice the short-term success of their businesses based
on the vague and generally diluted notion of the cost-effectiveness of preventative care.
Consumers will not immediately embrace the wisdom of importance of primary
preventative care, so returns from such a change for insurance firms could take years to
materialize. Though the success of preventative care has been proven, investors will
readjust their investments based on short-term performance. Therefore if one company
decides to move to a long-term trajectory, they will suffer greatly in the short run because
investors will move to a firm that has maintained their short-term successes, thus
evaporating significant capital for the insurance companies.
The final topic that Dr. Reiman’s proposal indirectly addresses, and Herzlinger’s
reform does not, is the power of long-term aggregate sociopolitical considerations of
universal healthcare. If everyone pays into the basic insurance funds, everyone holds a
stake in cost reductions in the long run. This is a more abstract idea, but the idea of
community has proven a source of pride for many other countries, and a point of scorn
for its absence in the US system. By aggregating individual interests to stay healthy,
other preventative programs would be incentivized in a more major way at a national
government level to maintain public health.
This is a result that is not necessarily directly related to the system's changes, but
instead related to the social and political dynamics of having a common, universal goal in
limiting healthcare expenditures across the country. This would result in nationwide
incentive structures for good health practices, and could even result in legislation such as
minor cuts in premiums for individuals to the single-payer if health status is maintained.
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This would manifest in financial rewards for maintenance of steady blood glucose for
diabetics, as determined by their physician. This kind of universal incentive structure
would not be made available in a highly fragmented privatized health insurance sector.

RECONCILIATION OF THE TWO PLANS
The essence of the two plans is this: the single-payer will incentivize cost-cutting
through the use primary care for the general public, while the market-driven system
would force innovation of the provision of tertiary care for differentiated diseases, like
diabetes. However, both are incomplete without some facets of the other. The marketdriven system would exacerbate the growing demand for expensive treatment for diabetes,
rather than the less expensive basic care that could control the disease and reduce the
need for tertiary care. Conversely, the single-payer would suppress the demands of the
highly diverse population of the United States. Less incentive at tertiary innovation
would exist because the single-payer would offer only one mass market for primary care
products, treatments, and prescriptions. The external buyers Reiman offers to create an
outlet from the single-payer would not create a large enough demand pool to force
innovations separate from the demands of the single payer. Therefore, the single-payer
would eliminate the demand for the life-saving acute care and cutting edge technology,
procedures, and pharmaceuticals that US healthcare is known for. In order to address this
issue, a sustainable incentive for external insurance for chronic diseases needs to
supplement the single-payer network.
The single-payer is indeed the better option in providing the universal primary
care necessary to reduce systemic costs of diabetes treatment both in Mississippi cind the
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US by keeping the population healthier rather than curing it when sick. However,those
individuals whose disease does progress into needing the advanced care associated with
diabetes complications need to be pooled together to aggregate their demand. This would
create a much larger demand for encouraging the provider market to be responsive to the
needs of these individuals. Those diabetics whose disease advances or has advanced
beyond the limitations of primary care are provided the needed external focused factory
market. To create this pool, the single-payer system should mandate external chronic
disease insurance. By offering a large demand pool to insurance firms that would then be
willing to compete for it, the associated demanded innovation within the tertiary care
sector would be maintained.
This external chronic disease care market would not compete with the basic
services of the single-payer, but would result in diabetic ‘focused factories of sorts. The
resultant specialist outlet would be reimbursed on an individual success rate basis.
Insurance companies would not be allowed to reject chronically ill patients based on their
current health status. The insurance companies would also have to provide long term
contracts to their customers that would result in long-term incentives for health
improvement for the insurers, tertiary care providers, as well as the consumer, as
suggested by Herzlinger. The insurance companies would sign contracts with providers.
The providers are also prevented from rejecting patients based on health status.
These external chronic disease insurance companies would be paid through out of
pocket payments from individuals that result in a corresponding reduction of the
mandatory payments that such individuals would make into the single-payer. The more
the individual spends on a non-competitive private diabetic insurer, the proportionally
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less they would be forced to pay into the single-payer. Because chronic disease affects
such a high proportion of the population, enough demand would be created for the
differentiated specialty insurers to remain solvent.
These private insurance firms would operate as if they were in the market-driven
system that Herzlinger suggests, except that they would only be allowed to reimburse
chronic care focused factories on a per capita basis. Both the providers of care and the
insurers would be transparent through health outcome measures, as well as cost of
services provided by the clinics. The insurer would allot a flat sum associated with the
amount that the individual has paid for their private diabetes insurance, and this would
determine the amount freedom that the individual would be allowed in determining which
‘focused factory’ to invest their insurance paybacks in. Therefore, some differentiation in
both care providers for chronic patients would result, while insuring that all chronic
patients would get the care that they invest in.
The diabetics, once diagnosed with diabetes would be forced to start paying for
private diabetic-specific insurance, and the amount they pay into it would
correspondingly reduce their payments into the single payer. The federal government
would subsidize those individuals that cannot afford the additional payments. The basic,
primary-level, diabetic patients would still pay into the single-payer and be receiving
their basic CcU’e from their single-payer provider at an income adjusted rate, but this rate
could be correspondingly reduced by payments into the chronic care private entity. Not
on a 1:1 basis, because that would reduce the budget of the single-payer too much, but
perhaps and some income-adjusted percentage decrease per amount spent into their
chronic insurance program.
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The result would be an individual incentive to maintain a primary status so as to
avoid the additional payment into a private chronic insurer, while simultaneously
allowing for the specialized efficiency associated with focused factory settings for
advanced chronic care. These clinics would provide services to maintain the health of the
diabetics needing more advanced care that would be demanded by complications
associated with the disease. Such focused factories, as described by Herzlinger would be
a cooperative group of medical professionals all working to return patients to a health
status that allows them a relatively normal lifestyle. It would be the clinic’s successes in
returning their patients to health that would be measured by performance metrics.
These factories would have to be diversified and efficient in their services
provided in order to meet the long-term health goals of their patients. This would also
alleviate some of the strain placed on the single-payer system associated with the
overhead costs of treating diabetic patients strictly in a hospital, especially when
unnecessary. The individual consumer would also be able to make health decisions based
on the incentives to return to general health so as to avoid the out-of-pocket copays
associated with private chronic care insurers and clinics.
Of course, this idea is very general, and I am obviously not a public health expert,
but it seems that by incentivizing a secondary private market, rather than working against
one, the single-payer system would allow for a more cooperative effort with private firms
at insuring the health of individuals at a reduced cost to the system in general. It would
also allow those individuals that would make the most frequent contact with the system,
the chronically ill, an opportunity to make decisions about their care in a more
empowering manner. This would also allow for some stronger incentives for the
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individuals to avoid the diabetic out-of-pocket payments into the private insurance sector,
as well as copays associated with the private sector, even if their payments into the
single-payer were adjusted to help moderate individual costs.

SUMMARY
The core problem with Herzlinger’s argument is that it focuses on the health of
independent individuals in an exclusive manner. Reiman’s proposal involves the
alignment of key interests to keep the individuals healthy. This is especially relevant in
Mississippi, with over 10% of its population suffering from diabetes. The major
difference in perspective of the two arguments is that Reiman’s offers a public health
approach to handling the diabetes epidemic universally, rather than focusing solely on
how to improve quality of care at the point of contact with the healthcare system, as
Herzlinger’s proposal insinuates.
By allowing all individuals access to the system at a most basic level, all
economic strata are empowered to make decisions regarding maintaining their diabetes
through lifestyle choices with the support of a physician whose interests are aligned with
their own. Rather than leaving large gaps in the population that uninsured diabetics fall
into, and are therefore unable to use basic primary care to control their diabetes then are
forced into the ER when complications arise, all individuals are given the ability to
control their health status regardless of their income. Beyond assuming that they will
make the rational economic decision that it is in their best interest to control their
diabetes, they are able to commit themselves to making a quality-of-life decision, which
is much more salient and all-encompassing to the individual.
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Herzlinger argues that market forces have the power to motivate in universally,
but health is much more than economic. Health involves life or death decisions that
cause individuals to ignore economic pressures. The health decisions made by
individuals are more than economically bound; they are bound by entire life experiences,
past, present, and future. This is where Herzlinger misses the boat on a general level.
The ethics behind market driven forces do not naturally align themselves with the quality
of health of an entire population, as can be seen by the evolution of our current healthcare
system, and the state it is in now. There will always be powerful business and political
interests involved if the window is left open to these interests, and these interests will
pass the burden on to the consumers. The consumers that will be most harmed are those
who are not fully protected by the system; the underinsured, rural, chronically ill, and
poor individuals. Of which, Mississippi is a leader of the nation on all four statistics.
It is for these reasons that Dr. Reiman’s proposal is indeed the least of the three
evils if wholly implemented. It allows for individual choice making, universal coverage,
an option to operate outside the system, and ethical incentives for preventative and
primary care. All of which address the needs of the diabetic population of Mississippi in
a direct and all-encompassing manner. It is in no way a panacea for the health of the
entire population, however, and should not be expected to be. The single-payer system
eliminates a lot of competition associated with differentiated demand. Also, by nature,
allocations will have to be made, which involves some difficult decisions about what
procedures are and are not covered within the system.
By at least offering the option of the private-insurance pocket, it gives those
forced out of the system by the limited allowance of the system the same financial
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opportunity that exists today to obtain care outside the single-payer system. The single
payer could work in cooperation with the private insurance pockets if incentives are
given for the chronically ill to make insurance purchases tailored for their diseases upon
diagnosis. This system would not provide truly equitable care to the entire population, but
it would allow individuals entrance into a healthcare market at a basic, universal level, as
all other developed countries do (Reid).
The US could differentiate its actions from the rest of the world’s healthcare
structure by offering a public/private cooperative effort at reducing costs and improving
health simultaneously by mandating the non-compete external insurance. Of course, the
ideological strain associated with this mandated private insurance program cannot be
ignored, but at the very least it would offer private insurance a niche in the newly
reformed healthcare market. In this way,some of the interests in the status quo could be
mildly placated in by a large market for their services left available alongside the single
payer system, rather than completely being eliminated.
If healthcare reform is not addressed in an expedient manner, there will be no
interests that go unharmed. The healthcare system will run itself out of business. This
would leave nearly one fifth of our economy in deep recession, as well as an entire
population unprotected from disease and injury. The chronically ill would be severely
handicapped, or even killed by such a failure of the system. The only individuals that
would be left with any options in regard to obtaining care would be those who have
external access, including the very wealthy, members of the military and veterans, and
national politicians. The rest of the population would be left to fend for itself. It is no
longer just an ethical, partisan, or ideological issue, but one of the most basic logic.

82

Everyone suffers if the system fails, so doing nothing is not an option. The sooner that
the key players involved realize the necessity of immediate cooperation in revamping the
US healthcare system, the better.
Healthcare reform is put to the test in the unique state of Mississippi. A reform
that is able to simultaneously address the poverty, high chronic disease rates, and large
rural population of the state of Mississippi will be universally appealing to the United
States. The social and economic forces at play in Mississippi intensify the problems of
US healthcare. It is for this reason that the previously ignored and marginalized states,
like Mississippi, should be used in developing a roadmap for national healthcare reform,
as was attempted by this thesis.
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